Tax Liens and Affordable Housing

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NYU’s Furman Center has released a Data Brief, Selling the Debt: Properties Affected by the Sale of New York City Tax Liens. It opens,

When properties in New York City accrue taxes or assessments, those debts become liens against the property. If the debt remains unpaid for long enough, the city is authorized to sell the lien to a third party. In practice, the city retains some liens (because it is legally required to do so in some cases and for strategic reasons in other cases), but it sells many of the liens that are eligible for sale. In this fact brief, we explore the types of properties subject to tax lien sales but exclude Staten Island due to data limitations and exclude condominium units. Between 2010 and 2015, we find that 15,038 individual properties with 43,616 residential units were impacted by the tax lien sale. We answer three questions: (i) what kinds of properties have had a municipal lien sold in recent years? (ii) where are those properties located in the city? (iii) what happens to a property following a lien sale?

We present this information to shine a light on a somewhat obscure process that affects a significant number of properties in the city. Also, the lien sale has a number of policy implications. Tax delinquency can be an indicator of distress; property owners who have not paid their taxes may also cut back on building maintenance and investment. This could have ramifications for owners, tenants, and neighborhoods. The city, social service providers, and practitioners in the community development and housing fields may find this descriptive information helpful as they think about interventions related to the health of housing and neighborhoods.

In addition, the choice of whether to retain a tax lien or to sell the lien also presents a policy choice for the city—selling the lien allows the city to collect needed revenue it is owed; but, with the sale, the city gives up the leverage that it holds over delinquent property owners, which can be used in some cases to move properties into affordable housing programs or meet other strategic goals. The city could retain that leverage by selling fewer liens; but, then it would not only lose the revenue generated by the sale, it would also incur the cost of foreclosing or alternative interventions. The lien sale is part of the city’s municipal debt collection program, and the city must be careful that policy changes do not undermine the city’s debt collection efforts.

With this fact brief, we aim to shed some light on the real world consequences and opportunities triggered by the city’s current treatment of municipal liens. (1-2, footnotes omitted)

New York City has sure come a long way from the 1970s when the City was authorized to foreclose on properties with tax liens. The issue then was that the owners of thousands of buildings did not think it was worth it to pay their taxes. Their preferred strategy was to stop paying their bills and collect rents until the City took their properties away from them. After the City took possession of these buildings, it repurposed many of them into affordable housing projects owned by a range of not-for-profit and for-profit entities.

The Furman brief does not report on why building owners are failing to pay their taxes today. It is reasonable to think that, at least as to multifamily buildings, it is because of operational issues more than because of fundamental problems relating to the profitability of real estate investments in New York City. This is supported by the fact that, when it comes to tax liens, “many if not most debts would be repaid before foreclosure.” (11) Thus, while this brief sheds light on this shadowy corner of the NYC real estate market, it does not seem (as the authors agree) that tax liens will open a path to increasing the stock of affordable housing in the City as it had in the 1980s and 1990s.

Dollar Homes

Packmatt

Realtor.com quoted me in Buy a House for a Buck? The Real Story Behind $1 Listings. The story reads, in part,

Hidden deep within the bowels of real estate listings are a few head-scratchers that would no doubt catch any bargain hunter’s eye. They’re homes for sale for the grand total of one crisp American dollar. So what’s the deal? Are they for real?

I decided to find out by actually clicking, and calling, and learning the stories behind these tempting facades. And it turns out, $1 listings can mean many things. Here’s what this lowball price is actually all about.

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Possibility No. 3: It truly is for sale for $1, but…

The next four places for $1 that I check out are all rundown properties in Detroit. They range in description from “fire damage sold as is” (translation: a charred pile of lumber—pic below) to “bungalow with three bedrooms, one bathroom, basement and much more” (translation: “more” means plywood for windows and doors).

Still, some houses sit on decent lot sizes of 3,000+ square feet in neighborhoods that seem habitable at first glance. The listing agent won’t return my call, but I track down an agent willing to show me the various rundown homes. Though back taxes or liens on the property may jack up the price, I ask whether the house will really sell for $1. “Sure,” he says. “This is Detroit.”

Now that I’ve found a true $1 listing, should I hand over a George Washington for one of these fixer-uppers?

“When a house is being sold for a dollar, it means that the local real estate market has cratered,” says David Reiss, professor of law at Brooklyn Law School who focuses on real estate issues and community development. “Land has no value. Or even worse, it has negative value and buyers of $1 homes will end up getting snookered. Owning land comes with various mandatory expenses like real property taxes. It’s possible the true value is even lower than a dollar. In that case, you will see a lot of $1 houses staying on the market, as hard as that is to believe.”

Reiss further explains how the Motor City’s market cratered so deeply: “Real estate’s value typically comes down to location. If jobs have disappeared, if residents have disappeared, if services have disappeared—then value disappears.”

Beyond having zero worth, a $1 home is likely a gaping money pit. When the New York Times ran a piece on the subject in 2007, it found that “the houses often require hundreds of thousands of dollars in renovations.”

Though my search for $1 properties was a bust in the end, there once were $1 homes worth buying. “Think of New York City,” says Reiss. “Homes that were abandoned in the 1970s are now selling for seven figures.”

Bottom line? One-dollar listings may be a risky gamble, but, hey, you never know.

 

Property Tax Exemptions in Wonderland

 

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NYU’s Furman Center has released a policy brief, The Latest Legislative Reform of the 421-a Tax Exemption: A Look at Possible Outcomes. This brief is part of a series on affordable housing strategies for a high-cost city. It opens,

Since the early 1970s, New York City has provided a state-authorized, partial property tax exemption for the construction of new residential buildings. In the 1980s, the New York City Council amended the program to require that participating residential buildings in certain portions of Manhattan also provide affordable housing. Most recently, New York State extended the existing program through the end of 2015 and created a new 421-a framework for 2016 onward. However, for the program to continue beyond December, the legislation requires that representatives of residential real estate developers and construction labor unions reach a memorandum of understanding regarding wages of construction workers building 421-a program developments that contain more than 15 units.

This brief explores the possible impacts of the new 421-a legislation on residential development across a range of different neighborhoods in New York City, including neighborhoods where rents and sale prices are far lower than in the Manhattan Core and where the tax exemption or other subsidy may be necessary to spur new residential construction under current market conditions. We assess what could happen to new market rate and affordable housing production if the 421-a program were allowed to expire or if it were to continue past 2015 in the form contemplated by recently passed legislation. Our analysis shows that changes to the 421-a program could significantly affect the development of both market rate and affordable housing in the city (1, footnote omitted)

The 421-a program operates against the backdrop of a crazy quilt real property tax regime where similar buildings are taxed at wildly different rates because of various historical oddities and thinly-sliced legal distinctions. Like the Queen of Hearts, the rationale given by the Department of Finance for this unequal treatment amounts to no more than — And the reason is…because I say so, that’s why!

The brief concludes,

Our financial analysis of the possible outcomes from the 421-a legislation offers some insights into its potential impact on new construction. First, if the 421-a benefit expires in 2016, residential developers would lower the amount they would be willing to pay for land in many parts of the city. The result could be a pause in new residential developments in areas outside of the Manhattan Core as both buyers and sellers of land adjust to the new market.

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Second, if the newly revised 421-a program with its higher affordability requirements and longer exemption period goes into effect in 2016 without any increase in construction costs, the city is likely to have more affordable rental units developed in many parts of the city compared to what the existing 421-a program would have created. Condominium development without the 421-a program may still continue to dominate in certain portions of Manhattan, though the program appears to make rentals more attractive. (12)

The first outcome — lower land prices if 421-a expires — is not that bad for anyone, except current landowners. And it is hard to feel bad for them, given that they should not have expected that 421-a would remain in effect forever (and not to mention the rapid increases in NYC land prices). The second outcome — the new 421-a framework — sounds like better public policy than the existing program.

But one wonders — what would it take for NYC to develop a rational real property tax regime to replace our notoriously inequitable one, one that treats like properties so differently from each other. Can we escape from Wonderland?