Tag Archives: AEI

Seismic Shift in Lending?

Posted on by

Researchers at the American Enterprise Institute’s International Center on Housing Risk have posted a study that shows a “seismic shift in lending away from large banks to nonbanks.” (1) The key takeaways are

  • The dramatic decline in agency market share for large banks continued unabated in February, offset by an equally dramatic increase in the nonbank share.
  • Since November 2012, the large bank share has dropped from 61% to 33%, a move of 28 points, including a 1.2 point drop in February, a dramatic decline that has been met point-for-point by a 27 point increase in the nonbank share from 24% to 51%. Large nonbanks and other nonbanks have participated equally in the increase, accounting for 14 points and 13 points respectively.
  • Large banks have reduced the riskiness of their agency mortgage originations over the past few years. Nonbanks, in contrast, have shifted toward riskier loans as they have increased their market share.
  • Loans originated through the retail channel are less risky than loans originated through the broker and correspondent channels. This is true both for large banks and for nonbanks. But retail channel loans from nonbanks are substantially riskier than such loans from large banks.
  • The bottom line is that large banks attempting to regain market share would have to move well out the risk curve. (1)

While these findings are presented as negative developments, it is unclear to me that they are. Market share among big players in the mortgage market does vary dramatically over time. Given the new regulatory environment imposed by Dodd Frank, it is not surprising that the industry would readjust in some ways and that specialized nonbanks might increase market share once the financial crisis subsided. It is also unclear that moving out the risk curve is bad in today’s environment. Today’s lenders are quite conservative compared to the pre-crisis ones and there is good reason to think that lenders could safely loosen their underwriting somewhat. This is not to say, of course, that they should return to the bad old days. Just that there are more creditworthy borrowers out there.

Reiss on Marketplace: Cash Cows to Slaughter

Posted on by

I was interviewed on Marketplace for its story, Fannie and Freddie: Cash Cows Avoid The Slaughter? (sound file) The text of the story reads

We are making money – the tax payer, that is – on Fannie and Freddie Mac.

When Freddie Mac hands the treasury a $10.4 billion dividend next month, tax payers will have received more money in interest than was put in. (Technically the two institutions still owe the principal on the loan that bailed them out, but the interest they’re paying will shortly exceed that amount).

But.

There always is a but with these things.

Making money for the tax payer isn’t good if you ask those who want reform.

Back during the financial crisis, conservatives and liberals disagreed over whether Freddie and Fannie were a victim of or a cause of the housing collapse, but they agreed that the institutions needed reform. The profits are throwing a wrinkle into this debate.

“As long as Fannie and Freddie continue to pay substantial amounts of money to the government, they are looked at by some people in Congress as a great source of revenue that reduces the deficit,” explains Peter Wallison with the American Enterprise Institute. His concern – shared by reformers on both sides of the political spectrum – is that if Fannie and Freddie become cash cows, congress won’t want to touch them.

David Reiss, professor of law at the Brooklyn Law School, agrees. He says the financial crisis wasn’t a one time problem.

“We should think of it as that we dodged a bullet. There’s fundamental problems with the Fannie and Freddie business model which rests on this notion of privatizing profits and socializing losses.”

Freddie and Fannie buy mortgages from lenders, and then bundle them into “mortgage backed securities” that can be sold to investors. It’s useful because it converted illiquid mortgage loans into liquid securities. In plain English, it means a bank or investor who made a mortgage loan to someone didn’t have to wait around for 30 years to be paid back. They could sell their stake in the mortgage to Fannie or Freddie, move along, and go invest in other things. This helped more people get mortgages.

One concern was that Fannie and Freddie were simply too big and too concentrated. Another concern was that the federal government implicitly guaranteed investments in Freddie and Fannie, and that encouraged people to make home loans that were too risky.

Even without the complication of profits, the debate over how to reform Fannie and Freddie is at a stand still.

House Republicans don’t want the government involved at all, they want an efficient market. The Senate wants the government to be involved a little bit, essentially to promote housing.

“What I see,” says David Reiss, “is nothing really happening, and us being a holding pattern for a long time.”

It’s possible that reform-minded politicians will compromise before they lose their chance. Also possible they won’t.

Lifting a Shadow from Qualified Residential Mortgages

Posted on by

The self-named Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee of the American Enterprise Institute has issued a statement on The New Qualified Residential Mortgage Rule Proposal.  The Shadow Committee argues that agencies promulgating the newest version of the QRM rule

completely abandoned the Act’s requirement for a separate high-quality QRM. Instead, they proposed a QRM that was essentially the equivalent of the QM. This not only violated the congressional intent and nullified the retainage, but it pushed the US mortgage system back toward the very policies that fed the housing bubble, the mortgage meltdown and the financial crisis. It responds to those want the mortgage finance system to make mortgage credit widely available, but it ignores the need for a stable system that will avoid a future crisis. (2)

This is not fully accurate. The QRM proposal does not violate congressional intent because Congress merely stated that the QRM be “no broader” than the QM. (Dodd-Frank Act Section 941) There is also a fair amount of fear-mongering here because the Shadow Committee does not propose how we can responsibly balance credit availability with systemic stability.

Nonetheless, the Shadow Committee is right to note that the rules governing mortgages must balance a number of competing goals.
When the proposed rule was released, I had written that it should incorporate a “benefit ratio” which

compares “the percent reduction in the number of defaults to the percent reduction in the number of borrowers who would have access to QRM mortgages.” (20) A metric of this sort would go a long way to ensuring that there is transparency for homeowners as to the likelihood that they can not only get a mortgage but also pay it off and keep their homes.

A benefit ratio would not only help ensure that homeowners received sustainable mortgages, but it would also address the systemic concerns raised by the Shadow Committee. This is because the benefit ratio would protect lenders from their own worse instincts as they lower their underwriting standards in pursuit of increased market share in a booming market.