Best & Worst Places to Rent in America

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I was interviewed as part of WalletHub’s Best & Worst Places to Rent in America, 2024 edition. The interview reads,

What tips do you have for a person looking to get the best value in an apartment?

The smartest thing to do is do your homework. Start online to get a sense of the broad range of options. Then visit as many as you have the time for. Not only does it give you a sense of the surroundings (neighbors, neighborhood, shopping, etc.), but it also gives you a sense of the quality of the apartment. Do the appliances look well-maintained? Is there any water damage that may be a harbinger of bad things to come?

What are the most common mistakes that renters make when searching for a new apartment?

It is also smart to ask existing tenants about the landlord. Is it (or he or she) responsive to concerns? You should also search them on the internet to see what others have to say about them.

How can local policymakers make housing more affordable for renters without upsetting homeowners?

Local policymakers need to focus on expanding the supply of new housing. Restrictive zoning (for example, zoning that only allows the construction of single-family homes) keeps housing expensive in many communities. Various forms of restrictive zoning are a big problem in hot markets like the Bay Area in California and the New York Metropolitan Area. Housing takes too long to build, we do not build enough of it, and it costs too much. Local, State, and Federal policymakers all have to work together to increase the supply of housing so that costs go down across the board.

Temporary Interest Rate Buydowns

photo by Tobias Baur

I was quoted in This Strategy to Cut Mortgage Rates is Becoming Popular in Bay Area — but There are Pitfalls in the San Francisco Chronicle (paywall). It opens,

When first-time buyers Rachel Shatto and Randy Nelson purchased a home in Oakland in May, they negotiated an interest rate buydown that effectively lowered their mortgage rate, and thus their monthly payment, for the first two years.

Although the seller made a lump-sum payment for the short-term rate decrease at closing, they increased their purchase price to compensate for it. This temporary rate buydown left them with more cash to pay for repairs and improvements the first couple of years, Shatto said.

Both temporary buydowns, which effectively lower the rate for one to three years, and permanent ones, which reduce it for the life of the loan, have become more popular since interest rates started soaring last year.

In June, 2.8% of 30-year fixed-rate loans funded by Freddie Mac had temporary buydowns, up from near zero a year ago but down from a peak of 7.6% in December 2022, shortly after rates spiked above 7% for the first time in more than two decades. After dipping as low as 6.14% in February, they surged above 7% again in August and now stand at 7.18%.

Buydowns are most common on new homes. When rates rise, builders frequently offer temporary or permanent buydowns as one of several incentives buyers can choose from.

A survey of builders in August asked what has been the most effective way to get buyers off the sidelines. The No. 1 answer, cited by 69% of respondents, was mortgage-rate buydowns, said Ali Wolf, chief economist with Zonda, a new-home data and consulting firm that did the survey. Only 22% said price cuts.

“When they lower prices, buyers already under contract at a higher price tend to cancel their contracts and it becomes a vicious cycle,” Wolf said.

Landsea Homes is offering buydowns on select homes in select communities including the newly opened Alameda Marina. “We are only able to offer them on homes that we can deliver within 30 to 60 days,” said Josh Santos, Landsea’s Northern California division president. “I’d say 75% of our buyers in the last 60 days” chose buydowns in lieu of other incentives such as options, upgrades or homeowners association dues.

Some sellers are also offering them on existing homes that have been sitting for a while.

Whether they make sense for buyers depends on myriad factors including their overall finances, the cost versus savings, how long they plan to stay in the home, whether they spend or invest their monthly savings, who’s actually paying for them, and future interest rates, the last of which is unknowable.

Borrowers should make sure they understand how buydowns work, the potential pitfalls and other ways to save money on a mortgage.

How permanent buydowns work

A permanent rate buydown is fairly straightforward. The buyer pays fees, called discount points, to reduce the interest rate — and therefore the monthly payment — forever.

One discount point equals 1% of the loan amount. To lower the note rate by 1 percentage point, a buyer today might pay around three points to four points. This cost can vary widely depending on the day, the lender and other factors, said Westin Miller, branch manager with Pinnacle Home Loans in Santa Rosa.

To figure out how long it would take for your monthly savings to equal the points paid, divide the total upfront fee by your monthly mortgage payment (or plug the numbers into an online mortgage discount points calculator).

Suppose a buyer can permanently lower the rate on a $700,000 mortgage to 6.5% from 7.5% by paying three points, or $21,000. That would lower the monthly payment by about $470 a month.

Divide $21,000 by $470 you get 36 months, which is the breakeven point. A borrower who kept the loan for more than three years would come out ahead. The longer it was kept, the bigger the benefit.

If a buyer knew for sure that rates were coming down soon, it might be better to take the higher rate with no points and refinance when rates drop, although refinancers will generally have to pay some closing costs again.

“If you are going to sell or refinance in a few years, paying points doesn’t make sense,” said Jeff Ostrowski, a Bankrate analyst.

Some buyers get permanent buydowns because they need a lower rate to qualify for a loan, said Jason Barnes, mortgage sales supervisor with U.S. Bank in Campbell.

Buyers pay for permanent buydowns, but in a slow market they might be able to negotiate a credit from the seller at closing to help pay for it.

How temporary buydowns work

With a temporary buydown, the borrower typically takes out a 30-year fixed-rate loan but makes payments based on a lower interest rate during the first one, two or three years in exchange for a one-time payment that is deposited into an escrow account at closing.

The upfront payment is about equal to the interest savings during the discount period.

During this period, the borrower makes payments at the lower rate and the mortgage servicer draws from the account to make up the difference. At the end of the discount period, the borrower makes the full payment.

Suppose the note rate is 7.5%. With a 1/0 buydown, the buyer makes payments based on a 6.5% rate the first year and 7.5% in years two through 30.

With a 2/1 buydown the borrower pays at 5.5% the first year, 6.5% the second year and 7.5% in all remaining years.

Three-year buydowns are available but not too popular because of the steep price.

The borrower generally must qualify for the loan based on the note rate stated in the loan agreement, in this case 7.5%.

Most lenders require sellers to pay for temporary buydowns, meaning the cost comes out of their proceeds at closing. If the buyer has no choice between a true seller-paid buydown and a lower price, there’s little reason not to take the buydown.

In competitive situations, buyers might need to increase their purchase price to cover some or all of the buydown payment, in which case they’re paying for it indirectly. Here the cost/benefit analysis gets more complicated.

A real-life example

When Shatto and Nelson bought their “cute little 1927 Tudor revival” in Oakland, they took out a 30-year loan with a 2/1 buydown from LaSalle Mortgage, Shatto said. They’re paying based on a rate of 4.125% for the first year, 5.125% the second and 6.125% thereafter.

Over the first two years, the buydown will save them $15,470 in interest, which was the cost of the buydown.

Although the seller paid for the buydown, the buyers paid a higher price to compensate, said their agent Lindsay Ferlin of Red Oak Realty.

Did they make a good deal? Here’s one way to look at it.

They paid $866,000 and, with a 20% down payment, and borrowed $692,800. Had they not used a buydown and paid $15,470 less, they would have borrowed $680,424 with 20% down.

With the higher loan amount, they’d repay an extra $27,071 over 30 years — consisting of $14,695 in interest and $12,376 in principal. But during the first two years, they’d save a total of $15,470, and most people don’t keep a mortgage for 30 years.

“Outside of a few cases, this does not have a significant economic benefit for borrowers,” said David Reiss, a professor of real estate law at Brooklyn Law School. “It’s a little bit of smoke and mirrors. I don’t think it improves their financial condition other than in a few cases where you have a low income in the present and expect it to grow significantly after a couple of years.”

Housing Supply and The Housing Crisis

By James Cridland from Brisbane, AU - Crowd, CC BY 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=74365875

Opportunity Now interviewed me about how limited housing construction impacts the housing crisis:

Dynamic metropolitan areas like the Bay Area, LA, and New York City suffer from longstanding mismatches between the supply of housing and demand for it. Local communities control the zoning, and local voters (typically existing homeowners) have little incentive to increase the supply of housing. After all, more supply will likely increase the tax burden as new residents increase the demand for services (more schools, more infrastructure, more public safety). Homeowners are already in the market and generally like the way things are, notwithstanding their political views about the high cost of living for others and the epidemic of desperate homelessness that plagues all of these areas. The result of all of these local land use decisions is that very few units of housing are built in these communities, given the size and growth of the population.

Many coastal cities are high-opportunity areas, offering jobs to immigrants, young adults, and strivers of all stripes. They drive up the demand for housing even hours from urban centers, living in overcrowded units in many cases.

When demand outpaces supply, prices rise. Government can try to limit the effect of this pressure through a variety of means: rent controls, housing subsidies, right-to-shelter legislation. All of these interventions can assist certain segments of the housing burdened — current renters, new renters, homeless people — but to a large extent, they just reallocate scarce housing from one burdened group to another. That is not necessarily bad public policy given the current political realities, but it does not address the fundamental problem these communities face: There is not enough housing for all of the people who live in them. A broad coalition of decision-makers needs to face this reality and develop long-term strategies to build a lot more housing where all of these people want to live — for access to economic opportunity, for proximity to family, for all of the reasons that people want to relocate and build a life for themselves and their loved ones.

High Rents and Land Use Regulation

photo by cincy Project

The Federal Reserve’s Devin Bunten has posted Is the Rent Too High? Aggregate Implications of Local Land-Use Regulation. It is a technical paper about an important subject. It has implications for those who are concerned about the lack of affordable housing in high-growth areas. The abstract reads,

Highly productive U.S. cities are characterized by high housing prices, low housing stock growth, and restrictive land-use regulations (e.g., San Francisco). While new residents would benefit from housing stock growth in cities with highly productive firms, existing residents justify strict local land-use regulations on the grounds of congestion and other costs of further development. This paper assesses the welfare implications of these local regulations for income, congestion, and urban sprawl within a general-equilibrium model with endogenous regulation. In the model, households choose from locations that vary exogenously by productivity and endogenously according to local externalities of congestion and sharing. Existing residents address these externalities by voting for regulations that limit local housing density. In equilibrium, these regulations bind and house prices compensate for differences across locations. Relative to the planner’s optimum, the decentralized model generates spatial misallocation whereby high-productivity locations are settled at too-low densities. The model admits a straightforward calibration based on observed population density, expenditure shares on consumption and local services, and local incomes. Welfare and output would be 1.4% and 2.1% higher, respectively, under the planner’s allocation. Abolishing zoning regulations entirely would increase GDP by 6%, but lower welfare by 5.9% because of greater congestion.

The important sentence from the abstract is that “Welfare and output would be 1.4% and 2.1% higher, respectively, under the planner’s allocation.” Those are significant effects when we are talking about  real people and real places. The introduction provides a bit more context for the study:

Neighborhoods in productive, high-rent regions have very strict controls on housing development and very limited new housing construction. Home to Silicon Valley, the San Francisco Bay Area is the most productive and most expensive metropolitan region in the country, and yet new housing construction has been very slow, especially in contrast to less-productive large cities like Houston, Texas. The evidence suggests that this slow-growth environment results from locally determined regulatory constraints. Existing residents justify these constraints by appealing to the costs of new development, including increased vehicle traffic and other types of congestion, and claim that they see few, if any, of the benefits from new development. However, the effects of local regulation extend beyond the local regulating authorities: regions with highly regulated municipalities experience less-elastic housing supply. (2, footnotes omitted)

The bottom line, as far as I am concerned, is that localities that are attempting to deal with their affordable housing problems have to directly address how they go about their zoning. If the zoning does not support housing construction, then no amount of affordable housing incentives will address the demand for housing in high growth places like NYC and San Francisco.

Dems Favor Land Use Reform

photo by DonkeyHotey

The Democratic Party has released its draft 2016 Policy Platform. Its housing platform follows in its entirety. I find the highlighted clause particularly intriguing and discuss it below.

Where Donald Trump rooted for the housing crisis, Democrats will continue to fight for those families who suffered the loss of their homes. We will help those who are working toward a path of financial stability and will put sustainable home ownership into the reach of more families. Democrats will also combat the affordable housing crisis and skyrocketing rents in many parts of the country that are leading too many families and workers to be pushed out of communities where they work.

We will increase the supply of affordable rental housing by expanding incentives and easing local barriers to building new affordable rental housing developments in areas of economic opportunity. We will substantially increase funding for the National Housing Trust Fund to construct, preserve, and rehabilitate millions of affordable housing rental units. Not only will this help address the affordable housing crisis, it will also create millions of good-paying jobs in the process. Democrats also believe that we should provide more federal resources to the people struggling most with unaffordable housing: low-income families, people with disabilities, veterans, and the elderly.

We will reinvigorate federal housing production programs, increase resources to repair public housing, and increase funding for the housing choice voucher program. And we will fight for sufficient funding to end chronic homelessness.

We must make sure that everyone has a fair shot at homeownership. We will lift up more families and keep the housing market robust and inclusive by defending and strengthening the Fair Housing Act. We will also support first time homebuyers, implement credit score reform to make the credit industry work for borrowers and not just lenders, and prevent predatory lending by defending the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). And we will help underwater homeowners by expanding foreclosure mitigation counseling. (4-5, emphasis added)

Much of the housing platform represents a continuation of Democratic policies, such as increased funding for affordable housing, improved enforcement of the Fair Housing Act and expanded access to counseling for distressed homeowners.

But the highlighted clause seems to represent a new direction for the Democratic Party: an acknowledgement that local land use decisions in areas of economic opportunity (read: the Northeast, the Bay Area and similar dynamic regions) are having a negative impact on low- and moderate-income households who are priced out of the housing markets because demand far outstrips supply.

This is a significant development in federal housing policy, flowing from work done by Edward Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko, among others, who have demonstrated the out-sized effect that the innumerable land use decisions made by local governments have had on the availability of affordable housing regionally and nationally.

There is a lot of ambiguity in the phrase “easing local barriers to building new affordable rental housing developments,” but the federal government has a lot of policy tools available to it to do just that. If Democrats are able to implement this aspect of the party platform, it could have a very positive impact on the prospects of households that are priced out of the regions where all the new jobs are being created.