Federal Home Loan Banks’ Liquidity Role During Financial Crises

The historic Federal Home Loan Bank Board Building            AgnosticPreachersKid CC BY-SA 4.0

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has invited me to participate in a review of the Federal Home Loan Banks’ Liquidity Role During Financial Crises. I have previously written about the FHLBs here. The invite reads in part,

GAO is an independent, nonpartisan federal agency that supports Congress by evaluating federal programs and activities. In response to a request from the House Committee on Financial Services, our team is conducting a review of the Federal Home Loan Banks’ (FHLBank) liquidity role during financial crises.

As part of our work, we plan to provide Congress and the public more information on the strengths, limitations, and feasibility of certain changes that academics, interest groups, and others have suggested to address perceived issues with FHLBank lending during crises. We identified the changes through a review of academic, trade, and grey (dissertations, blog posts, etc.) literature since 2007. We then narrowed the list down to a shorter list of changes for further discussion. While we recognize there is currently substantial discussion around the FHLBanks’ housing mission and membership, we are focusing on FHLBanks’ lending to banks. Please note that the changes to be discussed are not GAO recommendations.

The GAO is seeking input “from individuals, organizations, federal agencies, and FHLBanks on the list of changes to address concerns with FHLBank lending during crises.” I had previously written that while the FHLBank System

was originally designed to support homeownership, it has morphed into a provider of liquidity for large financial institutions.

Banks like JPMorgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp., Citibank NA and Wells Fargo & Co. are among its biggest beneficiaries and homeownership is only incidentally supported by their involvement with it.

As part of the comprehensive review of the system, we should give thought to at least changing the name of the system so that it cannot trade on its history as a supporter of affordable homeownership. But we should go even farther and give some thought to spinning off its functions into other parts of the federal financial infrastructure as its functions are redundant with theirs.

This GAO review is a good start to subjecting the System to such a comprehensive review!

The Wayward Mission of the Federal Home Loan Bank System

Adam Fagen CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

I recently submitted this comment to the Federal Housing Finance Agency in response to its request for input about the mission of the Federal Home Loan Bank System. It opens,

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (the “FHFA”) has requested Input regarding the regulatory statement of the Federal Home Loan Bank System’s (the “System”) mission to better reflect its appropriate role in the housing finance system. I commend the FHFA for being realistic about the System in its Request for Input; it acknowledges that there is a mismatch between its mission and its current operations.

The System’s operations do not do nearly enough to support the System’s stated mission of supporting the financing of housing. The System should recommit to that goal in measurable ways or its name and/or mission should be changed to better reflect its current operations.

While the System was originally designed to support homeownership, it has morphed into a provider of liquidity for large financial institutions. Banks like JPMorgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp., Citibank NA and Wells Fargo & Co. are among its biggest beneficiaries and homeownership is only incidentally supported by their involvement with it.

As part of the comprehensive review of the System, we should give thought to at least changing the name of the System so that it cannot trade on its history as a supporter of affordable homeownership. Or we should go even farther and give some thought to spinning off its functions into other parts of the federal financial infrastructure as its functions are redundant with theirs. But best of all would be a recommitment by the System to the measurable support of financing for housing.

This comment draws from a column (paywall) I had published when the FHFA first embarked on its reevaluation of the FLBLS.

Rethinking The Federal Home Loan Bank System

photo by Tony Webster

Law360 published my column, Time To Rethink The Federal Home Loan Bank System. It opens,

The Federal Housing Finance Agency is commencing a comprehensive review of an esoteric but important part of our financial infrastructure this month. The review is called “Federal Home Loan Bank System at 100: Focusing on the Future.”

It is a bit of misnomer, as the system is only 90 years old. Congress brought it into existence in 1932 as one of the first major legislative responses to the Great Depression. But the name of the review also signals that the next 10 years should be a period of reflection regarding the proper role of the system in our broader financial infrastructure.

Just as the name of the review process is a bit misleading, so is the name of the Federal Home Loan Bank system itself. While it was originally designed to support homeownership, it has morphed into a provider of liquidity for large financial institutions.

Banks like JPMorgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp., Citibank NA and Wells Fargo & Co. are among its biggest beneficiaries and homeownership is only incidentally supported by their involvement with it.

As part of the comprehensive review of the system, we should give thought to at least changing the name of the system so that it cannot trade on its history as a supporter of affordable homeownership. But we should go even farther and give some thought to spinning off its functions into other parts of the federal financial infrastructure as its functions are redundant with theirs. 

Credit Reporting Complaints

photo by Erin Stevenson O'Connor

The Huffington Post quoted me in The Real Reason Everyone Complains About Credit Reporting Agencies. It opens,

The most complained-about financial institutions aren’t banks or credit card companies. They’re credit reporting agencies — and by a wide margin.

In fact, the big three credit agencies topped the latest Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) monthly report. Equifax attracted an average of 1,470 complaints during a three-month period from May to July. Experian took second place with 1,272 complaints, and TransUnion had 1,202 complaints. As a category, all of the credit reporting agencies are up by about 30 percent from the same period a year ago.

By comparison, the most complained about bank, Citibank, had only an average of 922 complaints during the same period.

So why all the gripes? To answer that question, you have to take a closer look at a society that’s heavily dependent on credit and at the companies that determine how much credit each member of society gets. But the answer also reveals a broken system and a few workarounds that could help you avoid becoming another statistic.

The CFPB did not respond to a request for a comment about its complaint data. Neither did two credit reporting agencies, Experian and TransUnion. Equifax deferred to the Consumer Data Industry Association (CDIA), the trade association for the credit reporting industry.

Decoding the numbers

A CDIA representative suggested the government’s complaint numbers are inflated because they fail to distinguish between complaints and “innocuous” disputes.

“For example, consumers who are reviewing their credit reports for the first time might question an item they don’t recognize or understand and then lodge a complaint,” says Bill Mashek, the CDIA spokesman. “A consumer might also lodge a complaint against one of the credit reporting agencies when their issue is actually with another entity such as a lender.”

The credit agencies also say the government fails to verify any of the complaints; it simply reports them. And it has no way of weeding out potential errors, such as when consumers question an item they don’t recognize or understand on their credit report.

Consumers have a different perspective. They’re people like Peter Hoagland, a consultant from Warrenton, Va., whose homeowner insurance bill rose unexpectedly this year. He hadn’t made any claims, but soon discovered the reason: His credit rating insurance score taken a hit. He contacted his credit reporting agency. ” I could find no one to give me a credible explanation,” he says.

Hoagland contacted his insurance company and explained the problem, but the company stuck with its rate increase anyway.

“It feels to me that insurance companies are using these ratings as contrived reasons to raise rates,” he says. “They can’t cite claims I have made or increased risk with my home. So they hide behind these dubious insurance score ratings as justification to raise rates.”

It’s complicated

David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School
, says stories like Hoagland’s are common because credit scores affect almost everyone. They’re also difficult to explain.

“The credit reporting agencies have a big impact on whether someone can get a mortgage to buy a house as well as on setting the interest rate that they will ultimately pay,” he says. “At the same time, they often act in mysterious ways in terms of what they include and do not include on their reports.”

Monday’s Adjudication Roundup

  • BNY Mellon files a brief on writ for cert with the Supreme Court warning the potential for “warping” the residential mortgage-backed securities market if it overturns the Second Circuit’s decision finding that provisions of the Trust Indenture Act did not apply to the securities at issue.
  • Investors of Citibank file a class action in NY state court claiming that Citibank ignored toxic residential mortgage-backed securities causing $2.3 billion in losses.
  • Investors sue RAIT Financial Trust and its trustees alleging that the trust knew about subsidiary pocketing fees leading to a $21.5 million SEC settlement.

Monday’s Adjudication Roundup

Monday’s Adjudication Roundup