Reiss on The Future of the Private Label Securities Market

I have posted The Future of the Private Label Securities Market to SSRN (as well as to BePress). I wrote this in response to the Department of Treasury’s request for input on this topic. The abstract reads,

The PLS market, like all markets, cycles from greed to fear, from boom to bust. The mortgage market is still in the fear part of the cycle and recent government interventions in it have, undoubtedly, added to that fear. In recent days, there has been a lot of industry pushback against the government’s approach, including threats to pull out of various sectors. But the government should not chart its course based on today’s news reports. Rather, it should identify fundamentals and stick to them. In particular, its regulatory approach should reflect an attempt to align incentives of market actors with government policies regarding appropriate underwriting and sustainable access to credit. The market will adapt to these constraints. These constraints should then help the market remain healthy throughout the entire business cycle.

The Ghosts of the Housing Bubble

NYC Councilmember Daniel Garodnick has released a report, The Ghosts of the Housing Bubble: How Debt, Deterioration, and Foreclosure Continue to Haunt New York after the Crash. The report opens,

New York continues to have the highest rents in the country and a housing crisis that has lasted for decades. Many residential rents are below market value – a result of the myriad of state and local laws that have been implemented to protect working and middle class tenants from being forced out of their homes. This gap between the current affordable rent and potential fair market value can fuel the imaginations of investors and owners who dream of squeezing out the unrealized value hidden in these properties. This leads some developers to make riskier and riskier decisions following visions of real estate fortune, only to find themselves tilting at windmills, stuck with unpayable mortgages and escalating maintenance costs. (1)

The report proposes a number of interesting solutions to the problems it identifies, all of which should be looked into further. I am particularly intrigued by the proposal that Community Reinvestment Act exams should include a review of “the quality of the investments being made, measuring if banks are lending mortgages to landlords with portfolios of distressed housing. Were their bad loans to be reflected in their CRA ratings, banks might change their behavior.” (8)

But as with a similar ANHD report, the magnitude of the proposed solutions does not seem to match that of the identified problems. Market forces are extraordinarily powerful in NYC right now. It is unclear whether initiatives such as the “First Look Program,” which gives “good developers the first opportunity to buy” properties in foreclosure, can do anything when valuations are so frothy and predatory equity is on the prowl. (1)

That being said, the report is still quite valuable for shining light once again on the problem of owners who seek to illegally force rent regulated tenants out of their homes.

 

Duties to Serve in Housing Finance

Adam Levitin and Janneke Ratcliffe have posted Rethinking Duties to Serve in Housing Finance to SSRN (also on the Harvard Center for Housing Studies site here). The paper states that

an important question going forward concerns the role of duties to serve (DTS) — obligations on lending institutions to reach out to traditionally underserved communities and borrowers. Should there be DTS, and if so, who should have the responsibility to serve whom, with what, and how? (2)

These are, indeed, important questions as regulators chart a course between requiring safe underwriting by lenders and ensuring access to credit for communities that have historically had little access to sustainable credit. The authors distinguish fair lending from duties to serve, with the former being an obligation not to discriminate and the latter being an affirmative duty to address the “disparity of financial opportunity.” (2) The paper describes two main DTS regimes,the Community Reinvestment Act and the Fannie/Freddie housing goals, as well as their limitations.

The paper concludes that the “aftermath of the housing bubble presents an opportunity to rebuild DTS” and proposes a set of reforms. (29) I highlight the first two here:

  1. “DTS should apply universally to the entire primary market,” covering both depositories and non-depositories in order to avoid incentives to engage in regulatory arbitrage. (30)
  2. “DTS should apply equally for all secondary market entities,” not just the Fannies and Freddies of the world. (30)

This paper has a lot to offer thoughtful policymakers. As with everything to do with our massive housing finance system, however, the devil is in the details of any regulatory regime. Mandatory duties to serve must be drafted to so that they are consistent with safe underwriting practices. This paper starts a conversation about doing just that.

Qualified Mortgages and The Community Reinvestment Act

Regulators issued an Interagency Statement on Supervisory Approach for Qualified and Non-Qualified Mortgage Loans relating to the interaction between the QM rules and Community Reinvestment Act enforcement. This statement complements a similar rule issued in October that addressed the interaction between the QM rules and fair lending enforcement.

The statement acknowledges that lenders are still trying to figure out their way around the new mortgage rules (QM & ATR) that will go into effect in January. The agencies state that “the requirements of the Bureau’s Ability-to-Repay Rule and CRA are compatible. Accordingly, the agencies that conduct CRA evaluations do not anticipate that institutions’ decision to originate only QMs, absent other factors, would adversely affect their CRA evaluations.” (2)

This is important for lenders who intend to only originate plain vanilla QMs. There have been concerns that doing so may result in comparatively few mortgages being CRA-eligible. It seems eminently reasonable that lenders not find themselves between a CRA rock and a QM hard place if they decide to go the QM-only route. That being said, it will be important to continue to monitor whether low- and moderate-income neighborhoods are receiving sufficient amounts of mortgage credit. Given that major lenders are likely to originate non-QM products, this may not be a problem. But we will have to see how the non-QM sector develops next year before we can know for sure.

New Affordable Housing Goals Set for Fannie and Freddie

The FHFA issued a final rule.  The summary is as follows:

The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 (Safety and Soundness Act) requires the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to establish annual housing goals for mortgages purchased by the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) (collectively, the Enterprises). FHFA previously established housing goals for the Enterprises through 2011. This final rule establishes new levels for the housing goals for 2012 through 2014, consistent with the requirements of the Safety and Soundness Act.

The new goal levels are lower than those from the last couple of years.  For a taste of the controversy surrounding affordable housing goals see this, this and this on the one hand and see this, this and this on the other.  My own take is that Wallison and Pinto make broad claims about the negative effects of affordable housing goals that attach big effects to long ago events.  Their claims have not been supported empirically and have not gone through a peer review process.  That being said, I think it is valuable to draw attention to the unintended effects of government policies.  Going forward, Congress and the FHFA should be very careful in their program design to ensure that housing policies have their desired effects — no more, no less.