Banks Should Know Their Investment Risks

Nathaniel Zumbach

The latest issue of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Supervisory Insights (Devoted to Advancing the Practice of Bank Supervision) has an esoteric, but important article on Bank Investment in Securitizations: The New Regulatory Landscape in Brief (starting on page 13). The article opens,

The recent financial crisis provided a reminder of the risks that can be embedded in securitizations and other complex investment instruments. Many investment grade securitizations previously believed by many to be among the lowest risk investment alternatives suffered significant losses during the crisis. Prior to the crisis, the marketplace provided hints about the embedded risks in these securitizations, but many of these hints were ignored. For example, highly rated securitization tranches were yielding significantly greater returns than similarly rated non-securitization investments. Investors found highly rated, high yielding securitization structures to be “too good to pass up,” and many investors, including community banks, invested heavily in these instruments. Unfortunately, when the financial crisis hit, the credit ratings of these investments proved “too good to be true;” credit downgrades and financial losses ensued.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, interest rates have remained at historic lows, and the allure of highly rated, high-yielding securitization structures remains. Much has been done to mitigate the problems experienced during the financial crisis with respect to securitizations. Congress responded with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), and regulators developed and issued regulations and other guidance designed to increase investment management standards and capital requirements.

The gist of these new requirements is simple: banks should understand the risks associated with the securities they buy and should have reasonable assurance of receiving scheduled payments of principal and interest. This article summarizes the most pertinent of these requirements and provides practical advice on how the investment decision process can be structured so the bank complies with the requirements.

The guidance and regulations applicable to bank investment activities reviewed in this article are: „

  • Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC): 12 CFR, Parts 1, 5, 16, 28, 60; Alternatives to the Use of External Credit Ratings in the Regulations of the OCC;
  • OCC: Guidance on Due Diligence Requirements to determine eligibility of an investment (OCC Guidance);
  • Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC): 12 CFR Part 362, Permissible Investments for Federal and State Savings Associations: Corporate Debt Securities;
  • FDIC: 12 CFR Part 324, Regulatory Capital Rules; Implementation of Basel III (Basel III); and  „
  • FDIC: 12 CFR Part 351, Prohibitions on certain investments (The Volcker Rule).

As financial institutions move into an investment world where relying on credit ratings from third party providers is not longer sufficient, the advice in this article is welcome. One wonders though what the consequences will be, if any, for those who do not follow it.

What Was S&P Puffing?

I have been closely following DoJ’s suit against S&P since the complaint was filed in February (and see here, here and here).  DoJ alleges that S&P “issued or confirmed ratings that did not accurately reflect true credit risks” and seeks to obtain civil penalties pursuant to FIRREA. (4) Yesterday, Judge Carter issued a doozy of an order, denying S&P’s motion to dismiss the case.

Let’s remember that for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the judge takes as true all of the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint.  So, if a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, it means that the legal theory of the case is sound and that the plaintiff can win if the facts are as it alleges.

This should be the scariest passage in the order, as far as S&P is concerned:

Defendants lead off with a proposition that is deeply and unavoidably troubling when you take a moment to consider its implications.  They claim that, out of all the public statements that S&P made to investors, issuers, regulators, and legislators regarding the company’s procedures for providing objective, data-based credit ratings that were unaffected by potential conflicts of interest, not one statement should have been relied upon by investors, issuers, regulators, or legislators who needed to be able to count on objective, data-based credit ratings. (7-8)

This is repudiation of S&P’s “puffery” defense: their statements about their objectivity and rigorous methodology were merely “non-actionable puffery” along the lines of Charmin’s claim that it is the softest of all toilet papers. (8)

The Court follows this line of thought through to its logical conclusion:

if no investor believed in S&P’s objectivity, and every bank had access to the same information and models as S&P, is S&P asserting that, as a matter of law, the company’s credit ratings service added absolutely zero material value as a predictor of creditworthiness? (12)

One wonders how S&P executives responded to their lawyers when they proposed this argument — were they thinking about anything else other than winning this motion?  Did they consider how regulators might react to this argument?

And, while this goes beyond the matter at hand, the Court’s reaction to S&P’s argument is an implicit indictment of the business model of the major rating agencies: they are really in the business of selling licenses to access the capital markets more than they are in the business of issuing mini-editorials about the creditworthiness of securities, as they have successfully argued in previous cases challenging their ratings.