Tag Archives: declaration

Skyscraper’s Future up in The Air

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skyscrapers

The New York Law Journal quoted me in Upper West Side Skyscraper’s Future Uncertain After NY State Court Ruling. The story opens,

The development at 200 Amsterdam Ave. in Manhattan is slated to be the tallest building on the Upper West Side, with its 51 stories rivaling the skyscrapers located further downtown.

But whether this will ever happen has now become questionable, after a state court ruling that found city officials were wrong to follow an interpretation of city zoning law used by the developer to achieve the project’s awesome height.

Supreme Court Justice Franc Perry of Manhattan sided with local community groups looking to halt the building underway at the site. The plaintiffs—the Committee for Environmentally Sound Development and the Municipal Arts Society of New York—were joined by numerous local state and city elected officials in opposing what they say is not only an out-of-character monster development in the Manhattan neighborhood, but one that relied on a faulty zoning law interpretation to move forward.

“It is finally a declaration that zoning law means something and developers can’t make it up as they go along,” said Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady name attorney Richard Emery, who represented the plaintiffs.

Since 1978, developers and city buildings officials have relied on the so-called Minkin Memo, named after the former head of the city’s Department of Buildings’ Irving Minkin, for guidance on what experts call an ambiguity in the city’s zoning law towards so-called tax lots. These are additional subdivisions of city real estate, which can overlap with or be included inside a zoning lot.

Under the Minkin memo, developers have been able to pull together extra vertical building rights that nearby property owners aren’t using, offering the opportunity to boost the size of a project such as 200 Amsterdam beyond what would normally be allowed.

“The zoning resolution is ambiguous about when a zoning lot can be formed from partial tax lot; it never deals with that problem,” said Stewart Sterk, the Mack Professor of Real Estate Law and director of the Center for Real Estate Law & Policy at the Cardozo School of Law.

Initially, city officials had no problem with the move. DOB issued a permit to the developers for a residential and community facility building at the site of the Lincoln Towers condos on the Upper West Side. The developers relied on the Minkin memo as the basis for the acquisition tax lots that combined partial and whole lots to provide the developers with the vertical building rights needed for their skyscraper.

Shortly after DOB green lighted the project, the Committee for Environmentally Sound Development challenged the DOB’s decision. The challenge snowballed, and soon seemingly every local elected official, from state Assemblyman Richard Gottfried to borough president Gale Brewer, were opposed to the plan. The project’s permit was appealed by both CESD and the Municipal Arts Society to the city’s Board of Standards and Appeals.

In March 208, DOB made an official about-face on the project. In a letter from assistant general counsel to the BSA, the department said the Minkin memo provided an incorrect interpretation and that zoning regulations did not in fact intend for zoning lots to consist of partial tax lots.

The BSA was not persuaded by the arguments and in July 2018 voted 3-1 not to grant the appeal, with one board member abstaining. The plaintiffs soon after pursued a review of the BSA’s decision in state Supreme Court.

In subjecting the developers’ permit to further review, Perry pointedly took issue with BSA view of the process.

“BSA found that the Subject Zoning lot is ‘unsubdivided,’ within the meaning of the [New York City Zoning Resolution], simply because Developer has declared it to be so,” the judge wrote.

Noting that the referenced law states that a zoning lot is defined by being “unsubdivided” within a single block, Perry said BSA’s interpretation would render the term “superfluous,” and run “afoul of elementary rules of statutory construction.”

Since DOB saw the light on the Minkin memo during the appeal process, the court said the department’s statutory basis for the issuance of the permit to begin with was undermined. BSA’s decision was nullified and vacated, and the board was directed to review the project’s permit application “in accordance with the plain language” of the zoning regulation and Perry’s order.

As Cordozo’s Sterk noted, the development at 200 Amsterdam was far from the first to use the Milkin memo to justify partial tax lot usage in a building plan. Perry’s decision has the ability to throw uncertainty around zoning and building issues into a business sector highly adverse to such things, Sterk said.

But just as important for Sterk is the question now of when a government agency becomes estopped from changing its mind after it’s already induced people to rely on its existing interpretation.

“That’s a big problem in this case, because clearly developers have put millions of dollars into this project in reliance on an existing interpretation,” he said.

Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss, who is the research director of the school’s Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship, said he saw the case as less of a “good guy vs. bad guy” dynamic as much as one of whether the assurances of government officials can be binding.

“There’s a reliance on government statements and government permissions,” Reiss said, while noting the project has already commenced.

Should the case stand, he predicted it would serve to rattle developers’ confidence in their dealings with the city going forward.

“It’s more uncertainty in a process that’s already pretty uncertain,” he said.

GSE Shareholders Taking Discovery

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Judge Sweeney of the Court of Federal Claims issued an Opinion and Order regarding jurisdictional discovery as well as a related Protective Order in the GSE Takings Case brought by Fairholme against the United States.  I had previously discussed the possibility of a protective order here.

By way of background, and as explained in the Opinion and Order,

Defendant [the U.S.] has filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case, that plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe, and that plaintiffs [Fairholme et al.] have failed to state a claim for a regulatory taking. Plaintiffs respond that defendant’s motion relies upon factual assertions that go well beyond, and in many respects, conflict with, their complaint. The court thus entered an order on February 26, 2014, allowing the parties to engage in jurisdictional discovery. (1-2)

Judge Sweeney discussed the likely scope of jurisdictional discovery in a hearing on June 4th. She suggested that the big issue would be the extent to which she was going to defer to the federal government as to its request the discovery be limited in order to allow the government discretion in its operational and policy roles in the housing finance system. The judge indicated that she might be open to a limited protective order that allowed the plaintiffs to examine documents under certain restrictions so that they are not made public.The judge also made clear that she was not going to authorize a fishing expedition.

The Opinion and Order is pretty consistent with what she had suggested in June, but I would characterize it as a tactical win for the plaintiffs. Judge Sweeney signaled that she was not going to be overly deferential to the federal government.  This was clear throughout the Opinion and Order, regarding the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction over matters involving the FHFA, regarding the scope of the deliberative process privilege and regarding the overall scope of jurisdictional discovery that the Court will allow.  The plaintiffs should very happy with this result.

Court Decides that Lower Court Was Correct in Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Bank of America and ReconTrust on FDCPA Claims

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The court in deciding Brown v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Brown), 2013 Bankr. (B.A.P. 9th Cir., 2013) affirmed the lower court’s holding.

The plaintiff in this case alleged alleged that BAC and ReconTrust violated the CPA by promulgating, recording, and relying on documents they should have known were false, in particular: the MERS’ assignment, the successor trustee appointment, and the notice of default. Plaintiffs also alleged that ReconTrust’s issuance and use of the notice of default violated the FDCPA and that ReconTrust’s attempts to dispossess the debtor of her property constituted malicious prosecution.

As to the claim for wrongful foreclosure, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Washington Deed of Trust Act when they designated MERS as a beneficiary in the trust deed and MERS subsequently executed the MERS Assignment.

The plaintiffs contended that BAC’s authority to execute the successor trustee appointment and ReconTrust’s authority to execute the Notice of Default derived solely from the invalid MERS Assignment, invalidating both documents. They alleged that these transactions constituted a deception and, therefore, invalid transactions under the Trust Deed Act.

ReconTrust, Bank of America, N.A., as successor by merger to BAC, and MERS jointly brought a motion to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Civil Rule 12(b)(6). The defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the identified claims and, in addition, that the plaintiffs should be collaterally estopped from contending that BofA could not initiate foreclosure proceedings, based on the order entered by the bankruptcy court on the uncontested relief from stay motion.

Discovery War in GSE Litigation

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The United States filed a motion for a protective order in the Fairholme Funds case in the Court of Federal Claims (the Fairholme Takings case). You may not be familiar with protective orders. By way of background, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) states that “The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . . ..”

The federal government can request a protective order, like any other party.  But there may be some unique policies at issue when the federal government makes such a request.  For instance, the federal government may assert a variety of privileges to limit discovery.  These may include the deliberative process qualified privilege.  This privilege is asserted to protect communications about the government’s decisions.  Another example would be the qualified government privilege for official information.  This privilege would be asserted to maintain the confidentiality of official government records.  These are just two examples – there are a whole other range of privileges that the government might assert.  A court’s protective order analysis involving the federal government thus might take into account a variety of legitimate objectives that would not apply in a dispute between two private parties.

Here, the United States is seeking to limit discovery requests that “seek documents that relate in their entirety to the future termination of the conservatorships, with no end date” and “documents that relate (in part) to the future profitability of the Enterprises, again with no end date.” (2) The government argues that

Disclosure of these documents is contrary to the strictures of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), which bars a court from taking “any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions” of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) as conservator. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f). The declaration of FHFA Director Melvin Watt explains that disclosure would “have extraordinarily deleterious  consequences on the Conservator’s conduct of the ongoing and future operations of the conservatorships.”  Decisions about when and how to terminate the conservatorships and the future profitability of the Enterprises are at the heart of FHFA’s responsibilities as conservator, and Court-mandated disclosure of information bearing on such matters would jeopardize the stewardship of the Enterprises. (2, footnotes and some citations omitted)

While some of the government’s language in the motion seems hyperbolic, the court should certainly focus on the deliberative process privilege that the government asserts. Defining its scope will have implications far beyond this case, no matter that this case is incredibly important itself.

As to this case itself, it is interesting to see how even procedural disputes in the GSE lawsuits implicate the current operations of the GSEs as well as their post-conservatorship future. There is no question that the plaintiffs are very aware of their effect on the broader debates about the housing finance system as they press their individual claims in court. It is not yet clear to me how much the Court will weigh those considerations in its decision regarding the reach of the deliberative process privilege.