Tag Archives: disclosure requirements

Protecting the CFPB’s Overdraft Fee Rule

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Punch Cartoon

I am a signatory to a letter being sent to the House’s Committee on Financial Services, in opposition to H.J. Res. 59 (Hill), CRA Resolution to Overturn CFPB Rule on Overdraft Lending: Very Large Financial Institutions. The letter states,

The undersigned 278 consumer, civil rights, labor, legal services and community organizations and academics write to urge you to oppose H.J. Res. 59 (Hill) and any other effort to overturn the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s overdraft fee rule, which will reduce most overdraft fees from $35 to $5, stop manipulative practices by big banks, improve transparency, and put $5 billion back into the pockets of everyday people and their families. The public widely views current overdraft fee practices as unfair.

The overdraft fee rule closes a paper-check era loophole that has allowed big banks to trick people into paying excessive overdraft fees and earn billions in profits off of the most vulnerable families. The rule lowers most so-called “courtesy” overdraft fees from $35 to $5, saving households that pay overdraft fees an average of $225 a year. The rule gives big banks a variety of options to cover overdrafts, including safer, more transparent overdraft lines of credit with no price limit and the same disclosure requirements as credit cards. The rule only applies to very large institutions with over $10 billion in assets, many of which have already adopted similar protections. Smaller banks and credit unions are completely exempt.

We urge you to stand with everyday people over big banks. Banks should not profit off the struggles of working families through excessive, back-end overdraft junk fees. Please oppose H.J. Res. 59.

 

Treasury’s Overreach on Securitization Reform

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Treasury Secretary Mnuchin Being Sworn in by Vice President Pence

The Department of the Treasury released its report, A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities Capital Markets. I will leave it to others to dissect the broader implications of this important document and will just highlight what it has to say about the future of securitization:

Problems related to certain types of securitized products, primarily those backed by subprime mortgage loans, contributed to the financial crisis that precipitated the Great Recession. As a result, the securitization market has acquired a popular reputation as an inherently high-risk asset class and has been regulated as such through numerous post-crisis statutory and rulemaking changes. Such treatment of this market is counterproductive, as securitization, when undertaken in an appropriate manner, can be a vital financial tool to facilitate growth in our domestic economy. Securitization has the potential to help financial intermediaries better manage risk, enhance access to credit, and lower funding costs for both American businesses and consumers. Rather than restrict securitization through regulations, policymakers and regulators should view this component of our capital markets as a byproduct of, and safeguard to, America’s global financial leadership. (91-92, citations omitted)

This analysis of securitization veers toward the incoherent. It acknowledges that relatively unregulated subprime MBS contributed to the Great Recession but it argues that stripping away the regulations that were implemented in response to the financial crisis will safeguard our global financial leadership. How’s that? A full deregulatory push would return us to the pre-crisis environment where mortgage market players will act in their short-term interests, while exposing counter-parties and consumers to greater risks.

Notwithstanding that overreach, the report has some specific recommendations that could make securitization more attractive. These include aligning U.S. regulations with the Basel recommendations that govern the global securitization market; fine-tuning risk retention requirements; and rationalizing the multi-agency rulemaking process.

But it is disturbing when a government report contains a passage like the following, without evaluating whether it is true or not:  “issuers have stated that the increased cost and compliance burdens, lack of standardized definitions, and sometimes ambiguous regulatory guidance has had a negative impact on the issuance of new public securitizations.” (104) The report segues from these complaints right to a set of recommendations to reduce the disclosure requirements for securitizers. It is incumbent on Treasury to evaluate whether those complaints are valid are not, before making recommendations based upon them.

Securitization is here to stay and can meaningfully lower borrowing costs. But the financial crisis has demonstrated that it must be regulated to protect the financial system and the public. There is certainly room to revise the regulations that govern the securitization sector, but a wholesale push to deregulate would be foolish given the events of the 2000s.