Tag Archives: Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act

Fannie and Freddie Visit the Supreme Court

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Justice Gorsuch

Fannie and Fredddie investors have filed their petition for a writ of certiorari in Perry Capital v. Mnuchin. The question presented is

Whether 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f), which prohibits courts from issuing injunctions that “restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of” the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) “as a conservator,” bars judicial review of an action by FHFA and the Department of Treasury to seize for Treasury the net worth of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in perpetuity. (i)

What I find interesting about the brief is that relies so heavily on the narrative contained in Judge Brown’s dissent in the Court of Appeals decision. As I had noted previously, I do not find that narrative compelling, but I believe that some members of the court would, particularly Justice Gorsuch. The petition’s statement reads in part,

In August 2012—nearly four years after the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac1 in conservatorship during the 2008 financial crisis—FHFA, acting as conservator to the Companies, agreed to surrender each Company’s net worth to the Treasury Department every quarter. This arrangement, referred to as the “Net Worth Sweep,” replaced a fixed-rate dividend to Treasury that was tied to Treasury’s purchase of senior preferred stock in the Companies during the financial crisis. FHFA and Treasury have provided justifications for the Net Worth Sweep that, as the Petition filed by Fairholme Funds, Inc. demonstrates, were pretextual. The Net Worth Sweep has enabled a massive confiscation by the government, allowing Treasury thus far to seize $130 billion more than it was entitled to receive under the pre-2012 financial arrangement—a fact that neither Treasury nor FHFA denies. As was intended, these massive capital outflows have brought the Companies to the edge of insolvency, and all but guaranteed that they will never exit FHFA’s conservatorship.

Petitioners here, investors that own preferred stock in the Companies, challenged the Net Worth Sweep as exceeding both FHFA’s and Treasury’s respective statutory powers. But the court of appeals held that the Net Worth Sweep was within FHFA’s statutory authority, and that keeping Treasury within the boundaries of its statutory mandate would impermissibly intrude on FHFA’s authority as conservator.

The decision of the court of appeals adopts an erroneous view of conservatorship unknown to our legal system. Conservators operate as fiduciaries to care for the interests of the entities or individuals under their supervision. Yet in the decision below, the D.C. Circuit held that FHFA acts within its conservatorship authority so long as it is not actually liquidating the Companies. In dissent, Judge Brown aptly described that holding as “dangerously far-reaching,” Pet.App. 88a, empowering a conservator even “to loot the Companies,” Pet.App. 104a.

The D.C. Circuit’s test for policing the bounds of FHFA’s statutory authority as conservator—if one can call it a test at all—breaks sharply from those of the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits, which have held that FHFA cannot evade judicial review merely by disguising its actions in the cloak of a conservator. And it likewise patently violates centuries of common-law understandings of the meaning of a conservatorship, including views held by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), whose conservatorship authority under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”), served as the template for FHFA’s own conservatorship authority. Judge Brown correctly noted that the decision below thus “establish[es] a dangerous precedent” for FDIC-regulated financial institutions with trillions of dollars in assets. Pet.App. 109a. If the decision below is correct, then the FDIC as conservator could seize depositor funds from one bank and give them away—to another institution as equity, or to Treasury, or even to itself—as long as it is not actually liquidating the bank. The notion that the law permits a regulator appointed as conservator to act in a way so manifestly contrary to the interests of its conservatee is deeply destabilizing to our financial regulatory system. (1-2)

We shall see if this narrative of government overreach finds a sympathetic ear at the Court.

FIRREA Blanks

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photo by Mike Cumpston

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment (SDNY, Rakoff, J.) against Bank of America defendants for actions arising from Countrywide’s infamous “Hustle” mortgage origination program. The case has a lot of interesting aspects to it, not the least of which is that it does away with more than one billion dollar in civil penalties levied against the defendants.

The opinion itself answers the narrow question, when “can a breach of contract also support a claim for fraud?” (2) The Court concluded that “the trial evidence fails to demonstrate the contemporaneous fraudulent intent necessary to prove a scheme to defraud through contractual promises.” (3)

I think the most important aspect of the opinion is how it limits the reach of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recover, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). Courts have have been reading FIRREA very broadly to give the federal government immense power to go after financial institutions accused of wrongdoing.

FIRREA provides for civil penalties for violations of federal mail or wire fraud statutes, but the Court found that there was no fraud at all. It made its point with a hypothetical:

Imagine that two parties—A and B—execute a contract, in which A agrees to provide widgets periodically to B during the five-year term of the agreement. A represents that each delivery of widgets, “as of” the date of delivery, complies with a set of standards identified as “widget specifications” in the contract. At the time of contracting, A intends to fulfill the bargain and provide conforming widgets. Later, after several successful and conforming deliveries to B, A’s production process experiences difficulties, and the quality of A’s widgets falls below the specified standards. Despite knowing the widgets are subpar, A decides to ship these nonconforming widgets to B without saying anything about their quality. When these widgets begin to break down, B complains, alleging that A has not only breached its agreement but also has committed a fraud. B’s fraud theory is that A knowingly and intentionally provided substandard widgets in violation of the contractual promise—a promise A made at the time of contract execution about the quality of widgets at the time of future delivery. Is A’s willful but silent noncompliance a fraud—a knowingly false statement, made with intent to defraud—or is it simply an intentional breach of contract? (10)

This case emphasizes that “a representation is fraudulent only if made with the contemporaneous intent to defraud . . .” (14) While this is not really new law, it is a clear statement as to the limits of FIRREA. This will act as a limit on how the government can deploy this powerful tool as new cases crop up. Unless, of course, the Supreme Court were to reverse it on appeal.

New FHA Guidelines No Biggie

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Welcome_to_Levittown_sign

(Original Purchases in Levittown Funded in Large Part by FHA Mortgages)

Law360 quoted me in New Guidelines For Bad FHA Loans Won’t Boost Lending (behind paywall). It opens,

The federal government on Thursday provided lenders with a streamlined framework for how it determines whether the Federal Housing Administration must be paid for a loan gone bad, but experts say the new framework will have limited effect because it failed to alleviate the threat of a Justice Department lawsuit.

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development provided lenders with what it called a “defect taxonomy” that it will use to determine when a lender will have to indemnify the FHA, which essentially provides insurance for mortgages taken out by first-time and low-income borrowers, for bad loans. The new framework whittled down the number of categories the FHA would review when making its decisions on loans and highlighted how it would measure the severity of those defects.

All of this was done in a bid to increase transparency and boost a sagging home loan sector. However, HUD was careful to state that its new default taxonomy does not have any bearing on potential civil or administrative liability a lender may face for making bad loans.

And because of that, lenders will still be skittish about issuing new mortgages, said Jeffrey Naimon, a partner with BuckleySandler LLP.

“What this expressly doesn’t address is what is likely the single most important thing in housing policy right now, which is how the Department of Justice is going to handle these issues,” he said.

The U.S. housing market has been slow to recover since the 2008 financial crisis due to a combination of economics, regulatory changes and, according to the industry, the threat of litigation over questionable loans from the Justice Department, the FHA and the Federal Housing Finance Agency.

In recent years, the Justice Department has reached settlements reaching into the hundreds of millions of dollars with banks and other lenders over bad loans backed by the government using the False Claims Act and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act.

The most recent settlement came in February when MetLife Inc. agreed to a $123.5 million deal.

In April, Quicken Loans Inc. filed a preemptive suit alleging that the Justice Department and HUD were pressuring the lender to admit to faulty lending practices that they did not commit. The Justice Department sued Quicken soon after.

Policymakers at the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which serves as the conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and HUD have attempted to ease lenders’ fears that they will force lenders to buy back bad loans or otherwise indemnify the programs.

HUD on Thursday said that its new single-family loan quality assessment methodology — the so-called defect taxonomy — would do just that by slimming down the categories it uses to categorize mortgage defects from 99 to nine and establishing a system for categorizing the severity of those defects.

Among the nine categories that will be included in HUD’s review of loans are measures of borrowers’ income, assets and credit histories as well as loan-to-value ratios and maximum mortgage amounts.

Providing greater insight into FHA’s thinking is intended to make lending easier, Edward Golding, HUD’s principal deputy assistant secretary for housing, said in a statement.

“By enhancing our approach, lenders will have more confidence in how they interact with FHA and, we anticipate, will be more willing to lend to future homeowners who are ready to own,” he said.

However, what the new guidelines do not do is address the potential risk for lenders from the Justice Department.

“This taxonomy is not a comprehensive statement on all compliance monitoring or enforcement efforts by FHA or the federal government and does not establish standards for administrative or civil enforcement action, which are set forth in separate law. Nor does it address FHA’s response to patterns and practice of loan-level defects, or FHA’s plans to address fraud or misrepresentation in connection with any FHA-insured loan,” the FHA’s statement said.

And that could blunt the overall benefits of the new guidelines, said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

“To the extent it helps people make better decisions, it will help them reduce their exposure. But it is not any kind of bulletproof vest,” he said.

Thursday’s Advocacy & Think Tank Round-Up

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  • City lab’s analyzes why Billionaires Don’t Pay Taxes in New York, concludes that recent housing boom has been in the “ultralux” market and that the owners pay a fraction of their share due to a tax code that shifts the burden from owners to renters and from the wealthy to the poor.
  • The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities released an analysis of federal housing subsidy programs and their effectiveness
  • Corelogic’s National Foreclosure Report for March 2015 finds that while delinquency rates are down to 3.9% the percentage of mortgagees struggling to make their payments is still above pre-recession levels.
  • National Association of Realtors released data showing decreased homeownership rates across regional metro areas of the U.S., analysis of this data lead to the conclusion that continued decline in homeownership means the gains are going to fewer people and likely leading to worsening inequality in the U.S.
  • The Roosevelt Institute’s Rewriting the Rules of the American Economy: An Agenda for Growth and Prosperity by Joseph Stieglitz, seeks to completely revamp the rules and regulations that shape our economy, corporate behavior and the financial sector – with a view toward creating shared prosperity. Proposals related to real estate finance include, providing §11 bankruptcy protection for homeowners and creating a public option for the supply of mortgages.
  • The Urban Institute released Welding a Heavy Enforcement Hammer has Unintended Consequences for FHA Mortgage Market concludes that the significant, easily triggered liability of both the False Claims Act and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act have had a chilling effect, causing some lenders to do less origination to reduce their litigation risk.