- The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) has reported an uptick in mortgage rates from June to July 2015. This is according to the Monthly Interest Rate Survey (MIRS), which measures several indices of new mortgage contracts to arrive at a national average. July’s average was 4.02% up 17 basis points from June’s 3.8%.
- The FHFA has also released its second quarter Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) refinance results. According to the report refinances remained unchanged between the first and second quarters of 2015, 31,561 borrowers refinanced with HARP funds, which represented 5% of all U.S. refinances. HARP was established in 2009 in order to assist homeowners unable to refinance because of a decline in their home value. As of March the FHFA estimated that there were over 500,000 borrowers eligible for the HARP program.
- Also according to the FHFA house prices rose 1.2% from the first to the second quarter (Q2) of 2015 and are up more that 5% over Q2 201. This is according FHFA’s House Price Index (HPI) which has been up for the last 16 consecutive quarters.
Tag Archives: Home Affordable Refinance Program
Wednesday’s Academic Roundup
- Airbnb and the Housing Segment of the Modern ‘Sharing Economy’: Are Short-Term Rental Restrictions an Unconstitutional Taking?, Jamila Jefferson-Jones, Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, Vol. 42, 2015.
- The Use of Tenant Screening Reports and Tenant Blacklisting, Gerald Lebovits & Jen M. Addonizio, LEGALEase Pamphlet, New York State Bar Association (2015).
- Banks, Break-Ins, and Bad Actors in Mortgage Foreclosure, Christopher K. Odinet, University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 4, 2015.
- Determinants of Mortgage Default and Consumer Credit Use: The Effects of Foreclosure Laws and Foreclosure Delays, Sewin Chan, Andrew Haughwout, Andrew T. Hayashi, & Wilbert Van der Klaauw, FRB of New York Staff Report No. 732.
- The Effect of Mortgage Payment Reduction on Default: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinance Program, Douglas A. McManus, Jared Janowiak, Lu Ji, Kadiri Karamon & Jun Zhu, Real Estate Economics.
Watt’s up with Fannie and Freddie
There has been a lot of press coverage of FHFA Director Watt’s first public speech since taking on his job. Watt emphasized that
we must ensure that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac operate in a safe and sound manner. It means that we’ll work to preserve and conserve Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s assets. And it means that we’ll work to ensure a liquid and efficient national housing finance market. Our job at FHFA is to balance these obligations . . ..
He also set forth three goals for his FHFA:
Strategic Goal 1: MAINTAIN, in a safe and sound manner, foreclosure prevention activities and credit availability for new and refinanced mortgages to foster liquid, efficient, competitive and resilient national housing finance markets.
Strategic Goal 2: REDUCE taxpayer risk through increasing the role of private capital in the mortgage market.
Strategic Goal 3: BUILD a new single-family securitization infrastructure for use by the Enterprises and adaptable for use by other participants in the secondary market in the future.
These goals are all totally reasonable for the FHFA to pursue. But it is also clear that Director Watt is taking the FHFA in a direction that is quite different than the one pursued by his predecessor, Acting Director DeMarco. DeMarco had taken the position that the best way to protect taxpayers was to be pretty tough on everyone else. “Everyone else” included defaulting and underwater homeowners as well as originating lenders who had sold Fannie and Freddie tons of mortgages that did not comply with the reps and warranties that the parties had agreed to about the quality of those mortgages. DeMarco’s strategy was much criticized but also quite coherent.
Watt has made it clear that he is going to be more flexible with homeowners. He highlighted a pilot program in Detroit that will include “deeper loan modifications.” He has also made it clear that he is going to be more flexible with lenders, relaxing rep and warranty standards for mortgages that Fannie and Freddie purchase from lenders. These may be very good policies to pursue, but it would be helpful if he set forth a clearer vision of how safety and soundness is best balanced with liquidity and efficiency. Federal housing finance policy typically goes off the rails when its goals get all mixed up. Director Watt should ensure that FHFA’s safety and soundness goals are clearly set forth and that other goals for Fannie and Freddie are designed to work in harmony with them.
Post-Bubble Foreclosure-Prevention and -Mitigation Options in Your Town?
Bob Hockett has posted Post-Bubble Foreclosure-Prevention and -Mitigation Options in Seattle. I recommend it to those interested in issues beyond Seattle’s borders because it actually covers foreclosure-prevention and mitigation options across the country, although it looks at them with a Seattle focus.
He argues that
There is a potentially bewildering array of means available to at least some underwater homeowners, and these programs are also noteworthy for failing to solve the fundamental problems affecting these mortgages. There are three vitiating weakness share by nearly all of these means . . ..
The first weakness among currently available options is that they do not concentrate upon mortgage principal-reduction, meaning that they do nothing about the underwater status of underwater mortgage loans – which is the principal predictor of default and foreclosure – at all. Instead they rely upon temporary forbearance, term-extension, or interest rate reduction. . . .
The second weakness of the currently available options is that they are voluntary from the creditor’s point of view. That is problematic not because creditors lack in appreciation of their own enlightened self-interest or in desire to do the right thing, but because where there are structural or contractual barriers to principal reduction, as we shall see there are here in abundance, even creditor-benefiting such changes cannot occur on an adequate scale. Creditors are very often unable to do what benefits themselves and homeowners alike, meaning that voluntary programs can be useless.
Finally, the third weakness that the options discussed here suffer is that they do not extend to underwater PLS loans, which, as seen above, constitute the great bulk of troubled mortgage loans; they are in general available only to GSE and bank portfolio loans . . .. (11)
I found the review of “publicly encouraged debt relief” programs useful. (14) They include
- HAMP (the federal Home Affordable Modification Program)
- HARP (the federal Home Affordable Refinance Program)
- Miscellaneous Specialized HAMP Analogues
- FHA Short Refinance Program
- HAFA(federal Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternative)
- “Hardest Hit” Fund & Program (Treasury)
- HOPE NOW Alliance
- The Attorney Generals’ Settlement
Hockett also proposes some innovative approaches that he suggests that Seattle should consider including the use of eminent domain as well as a land bank. Worth the read.
