Tag Archives: JPMorgan

Federal Home Loan Banks’ Liquidity Role During Financial Crises

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The historic Federal Home Loan Bank Board Building            AgnosticPreachersKid CC BY-SA 4.0

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has invited me to participate in a review of the Federal Home Loan Banks’ Liquidity Role During Financial Crises. I have previously written about the FHLBs here. The invite reads in part,

GAO is an independent, nonpartisan federal agency that supports Congress by evaluating federal programs and activities. In response to a request from the House Committee on Financial Services, our team is conducting a review of the Federal Home Loan Banks’ (FHLBank) liquidity role during financial crises.

As part of our work, we plan to provide Congress and the public more information on the strengths, limitations, and feasibility of certain changes that academics, interest groups, and others have suggested to address perceived issues with FHLBank lending during crises. We identified the changes through a review of academic, trade, and grey (dissertations, blog posts, etc.) literature since 2007. We then narrowed the list down to a shorter list of changes for further discussion. While we recognize there is currently substantial discussion around the FHLBanks’ housing mission and membership, we are focusing on FHLBanks’ lending to banks. Please note that the changes to be discussed are not GAO recommendations.

The GAO is seeking input “from individuals, organizations, federal agencies, and FHLBanks on the list of changes to address concerns with FHLBank lending during crises.” I had previously written that while the FHLBank System

was originally designed to support homeownership, it has morphed into a provider of liquidity for large financial institutions.

Banks like JPMorgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp., Citibank NA and Wells Fargo & Co. are among its biggest beneficiaries and homeownership is only incidentally supported by their involvement with it.

As part of the comprehensive review of the system, we should give thought to at least changing the name of the system so that it cannot trade on its history as a supporter of affordable homeownership. But we should go even farther and give some thought to spinning off its functions into other parts of the federal financial infrastructure as its functions are redundant with theirs.

This GAO review is a good start to subjecting the System to such a comprehensive review!

The Wayward Mission of the Federal Home Loan Bank System

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Adam Fagen CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

I recently submitted this comment to the Federal Housing Finance Agency in response to its request for input about the mission of the Federal Home Loan Bank System. It opens,

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (the “FHFA”) has requested Input regarding the regulatory statement of the Federal Home Loan Bank System’s (the “System”) mission to better reflect its appropriate role in the housing finance system. I commend the FHFA for being realistic about the System in its Request for Input; it acknowledges that there is a mismatch between its mission and its current operations.

The System’s operations do not do nearly enough to support the System’s stated mission of supporting the financing of housing. The System should recommit to that goal in measurable ways or its name and/or mission should be changed to better reflect its current operations.

While the System was originally designed to support homeownership, it has morphed into a provider of liquidity for large financial institutions. Banks like JPMorgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp., Citibank NA and Wells Fargo & Co. are among its biggest beneficiaries and homeownership is only incidentally supported by their involvement with it.

As part of the comprehensive review of the System, we should give thought to at least changing the name of the System so that it cannot trade on its history as a supporter of affordable homeownership. Or we should go even farther and give some thought to spinning off its functions into other parts of the federal financial infrastructure as its functions are redundant with theirs. But best of all would be a recommitment by the System to the measurable support of financing for housing.

This comment draws from a column (paywall) I had published when the FHFA first embarked on its reevaluation of the FLBLS.

Monday’s Adjudication Roundup

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The End of Private-Label Securities?

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Steve Jurvetson

Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase

J.P. Morgan’s Securitized Products Weekly has a report, Proposed FRTB Ruling Endangers ABS, CMBS and Non-Agency RMBS Markets. This is one of those technical studies that have a lot of real world relevance to those of us concerned about the housing markets more generally.

The report analyzes proposed capital rules contained in the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB). JPMorgan believes that these proposed rules would make the secondary trading in residential mortgage-backed securities unprofitable. It also believes that “there is no sector that escapes unscathed; capital will rise dramatically across all securitized product sectors, except agency MBS.” (1) It concludes that “[u]ltimately, in its current form, the FRTB would damage the availability of credit to consumers, reduce lending activity in the form of commercial mortgage and set back private securitization, entrenching the GSEs as the primary securitization vehicle in the residential mortgage market.” (1)

JPMorgan finds that the the impact of these proposed regulations on non-agency residential-mortgage backed securities (jumbos and otherwise) “is so onerous that we wonder if this was the actual intent of the regulators.” Without getting too technical, the authors thought “that the regulators simply had a mathematical mistake in their calculation (and were off by a factor of 100, but unfortunately this is what was intended.” (4) Because these capital rules “would make it highly unattractive for dealers to hold inventory in non-agency securities,” JPMorgan believes that they threaten the entire non-agency RMBS market. (5)

The report concludes with a policy takeaway:

Policymakers have at various times advocated for GSE reform in which the private sector (and private capital) would play a larger role. However, with such high capital requirements under the proposal — compared with capital advantages for GSE securities and a negligible amount of capital for the GSEs themselves — we believe this proposal would significantly set back private securitization, entrenching the GSEs as the primary securitization vehicle in the mortgage market. (5, emphasis removed)

I am not aware if JPMorgan’s concerns are broadly held, so it would important to hear others weigh in on this topic.

If the proposed rule is adopted, it is likely not to be implemented for a few years.  As a result, there is plenty of time to get the right balance between safety and soundness on the one hand and credit availability on the other. While the private-label sector has been a source of trouble in the past, particularly during the subprime boom, it is not in the public interest to put an end to it:  it has provided capital to the jumbo sector and provides much needed competition to Fannie, Freddie and Ginnie.

Monday’s Adjudication Roundup

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Reiss on Toxic Debt Claims

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Bloomberg quoted me in Nomura First to Fight U.S. Toxic Debt Claims at Trial. The article reads in part,

Nomura Holdings Inc. will defend claims by a U.S. regulator that it sold defective mortgage-backed securities to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac before the 2008 financial crisis, becoming the first bank to take such a case to trial.

The Federal Housing Finance Agency, suing on behalf of the two government-owned companies, claims Nomura sold them $2 billion of bonds backed by faulty mortgages. The agency seeks more than $1 billion in damages in the trial, which is set to start Monday in Manhattan federal court.

Nomura, the Tokyo-based investment bank, is choosing to fight claims that 16 other banks settled after the blow-up of toxic mortgage bonds led to the global credit crunch. FHFA has reached $17.9 billion in settlements from banks including Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Goldman Sachs & Co. If Nomura prevails at trial, it may embolden other firms facing mortgage-related suits to defend themselves rather than settle.

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For Nomura and RBS to succeed, they will have to overcome Cote’s rulings as well as the widely held perception that banks packaged toxic debt and pushed it off on unsuspecting investors, said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

Reiss said Nomura may believe it can show it was more careful than other banks in structuring mortgage-backed bonds and stands a good chance of winning.

As the trial approaches, a settlement becomes less likely, Bloomberg Intelligence analysts Elliott Stein and Alison Williams said yesterday. Stein said a resolution this late in the proceedings may exceed his earlier estimate of $100 million to $300 million, particularly if Cote’s rulings continue to favor FHFA.

Reiss on Ocwen Settlement

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Law360 quoted me in New York’s Ocwen Deal Sets Tough Precedent For Regulators (behind a paywall). It reads in part,

New York regulators ordered Ocwen Financial Corp. to pay $150 million in hard cash and barred the company from claiming a tax deduction on the restitution payments in a mortgage servicing settlement that could set a new standard for regulators accused of being soft on the companies they penalize.

The New York Department of Financial Services’ penalty against Ocwen, which also saw the company’s executive chairman lose his job, comes amid criticism that major penalties against Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and other banks have been too lax. In a move aimed at addressing concerns over companies’ abilities to game the penalties, New York’s settlement specifically says Ocwen will not be able to use some of the techniques banks have used to lessen the blow of earlier settlements.

“They’ve tried to make a very tight settlement that demonstrates that Ocwen is suffering measurable costs for their behavior,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

The New York Department of Financial Services announced Monday that Ocwen, the country’s fourth-largest mortgage servicer, with some $430 billion in unpaid servicing balances, would pay out $150 million in “hard money” to New York homeowners who were victim to the company’s problematic servicing operations. A third of that $150 million would go directly to people who were foreclosed upon, and the remaining $100 million would go to housing-related projects chosen by the state.

But, unlike in previous mortgage-related settlements, Ocwen will not be able to count what are known as “soft dollar” modifications of mortgages they do not own and other techniques toward its settlement total, the DFS said. Banks and other servicers have been able to count such modifications in their total settlement amounts in previous deals, including the $25 billion national mortgage settlement from 2012.

Critics say such soft-dollar remediation has allowed law enforcement agencies, regulators and banks to inflate the amount of money banks and servicers are said to be paying out while limiting the amount of money they actually pay.

“It seems like a transparent settlement,” Reiss said.

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“A lot of the problems that people have had with these financial settlements are specifically identified,” Reiss said.