Tag Archives: material fact

Offering Opinions About MBS Exposure

Posted on by

The Tenth Circuit issued an opinion in MHC Mutual Conversion Fund, L.P. v. Sandler O’Neill & Partners, L.P. et al. (No. 13-1016 Aug. 1, 2014). The case concerns a 2009 stock offering by Bancorp. Bancorp was significantly exposed to mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and said as much in its securities filings. It also predicted that the market for MBS would rebound soon.

The highly readable opinion asks,

When does section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 impose liability on issuers who offer opinions about future events? The statute prohibits companies from making statements that are false or misleading. Establishing that an opinion about the future failed to pan out in the end may go some way to meeting that standard but it doesn’t go all the way. After all, few of us would label a deeply studied, carefully expressed, and earnestly held opinion about the future as false or misleading at the time it’s made simply because later events proved it wrong. To establish liability for an opinion about the future more is required. But what? Answering that question is the challenge posed by this case.

The opinion provides a clear overview of what differentiates opinion from fact in securities offering statements. The Court does this by carefully walking through three theories of opinion liability under section 11:

  1. “no one should depend on the puffery of salesmen . . . especially when the salesman’s offering a guess about the future” (5-6)
  2. “an opinion can qualify as a factual claim by the speaker regarding his current state of mind.” (7)
  3. “some subset of opinions about future events contain within them an implicit factual warranty that they rest on an objectively reasonable basis” (13)

In this case, the Court found that the plaintiffs could not establish liability under any theory.

The opinion provides a nice, clean framework for understanding section 11 liability claims.  This framework should apply to offering statements for MBS that set forth opinions about future events as well as those for any other type of security that does the same.

Court Finds that BAC Home Loans did not Have Standing to File Suit

Posted on by

The court in deciding BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Blythe, 2013-Ohio-5775 (Ohio Ct. App., Columbiana County, 2013) reversed the lower court’s decision and found that appellee had not established that it was the current holder of the note and mortgage, thus, appellee did not have standing to file suit.

Appellant Walter J. Blythe appealed the Columbiana County Common Pleas Court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., in a foreclosure action.

Blythe challenged the trial court’s finding that BAC had standing to foreclose in the absence of evidence that BAC was the holder of the note that created the obligation. Blythe relied on the material submitted by BAC in support of this claim.

This court held that the note that had been specially indorsed to a bank under R.C. 1303.25(A) could not be enforced by the loan servicing company (LSC) that was not the transferee or successor in interest of the bank. The LSC was not the holder of the note under R.C. 1303.32(A)(1) by virtue of the merger of the bank and a national association (NA). The LSC was not a non-holder in possession entitled to enforce under R.C. 1303.31 as it had not acquired the bank’s right to the note under R.C. 1303.21.

The court noted that even if the NA had filed the foreclosure suit, there was no evidence of the transaction, merger, or mergers that gave rise to an its interest in the note. The note was not bearer paper and could only be enforced by the bank since the note was payable to the bank, here the bank was the real party in interest in the foreclosure action, thus the LSC lacked standing to foreclose.

Ohio Court of Appeals Finds that BAC had Failed to Demonstrate that it had Standing to Accelerate the Note and Foreclose the Mortgage

Posted on by

The court in deciding BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Blythe, 2013-Ohio-5775 (Ohio Ct. App., Columbiana County, 2013) reversed the lower court’s judgment.

Appellant Walter J. Blythe appealed the lower court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., in this foreclosure action.

Blythe challenged the lower court’s finding that BAC Home Loans Servicing had standing to foreclose in the absence of evidence that BAC was the holder of the note creating the obligation. Blythe relied on the material submitted by BAC in support of this claim. Because the copy of the note filed by BAC was specifically indorsed to Countrywide Bank, FSB, not BAC, and there was nothing to indicate otherwise, BAC had failed to demonstrate that it had standing to accelerate the note and foreclose the mortgage. Thus this court reversed the judgment of the lower court and dismissed the suit for lack of standing.

This court held that a note that had been specially indorsed to a bank under R.C. 1303.25(A) could not be enforced by a loan servicing company (LSC) that was not the transferee or successor in interest of the bank. This court also held that the LSC was not the holder of the note under R.C. 1303.32(A)(1) by virtue of the merger of the bank and a national association (NA). Further, the LSC was not a non-holder in possession entitled to enforce under R.C. 1303.31 as it had not acquired the bank’s right to the note under R.C. 1303.21.

This court noted that even if the NA had filed the foreclosure suit, there was no evidence of the transaction, merger, or mergers that gave rise to an its interest in the note. Lastly, the court held that the note was not bearer paper and could only be enforced by the bank since the note was payable to the bank, as such the bank was the real party in interest in the foreclosure action. Thus the LSC lacked standing to foreclose.