Tag Archives: monetary policy

Chances of Negative Mortgage Interest Rates

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graphic by blamevaraia

TheStreet.com quoted me in Odds of Negative Interest Rates in the U.S. Are Slim. It reads, in part,

The odds of the U.S. lowering interest rates to negative levels remain low, because other forms of monetary policy such as quantitative easing could be adopted first.

The odds of utilizing quantitative easing are “quite high” or policies such as the use of repurchase agreements and the term deposit facility, said Michael Kramer, a portfolio manager on Covestor, the online investing marketplace and founder of Mott Capital Management, a registered investment advisor in Garden City, NY.

Choosing a negative interest rate policy (NIRP) in the U.S. would also affect the stock markets immensely and hinder bank profits.

“Due to the size of treasury and money markets, it could have some very severe ramifications,” he said. “In my view, our treasury markets are the safest and most liquid in the world.”

Investors would seek a higher return on capital elsewhere such as higher paying bonds which carry more risk, Kramer said.

“This could become problematic for the US government which is dependent on issuing debt to fund the government operation,” he said.

Negative rates in the U.S. would result in too much risk and backlash and would only occur if all other attempts by the Fed failed.

“At this point, the Fed has a few other tools it can use before it has to use the tool of last resort,” Kramer said.

The use of negative rates remains divisive despite the growing adoption of them in the central banks of the Eurozone along with Denmark, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland. In countries such as Japan and Germany, investors are forced to pay a fee instead of earning interest.

Lowering current interest rates to negative ones “would not be a panacea,” said former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, now a distinguished fellow in residence at a meeting hosted by the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy at Brookings last week. He also said the effect on consumers would be nominal.

During periods of low inflation, negative interest rates are now a more likely option to policymakers, but they have not proved to be a solution to boosting lackluster economies. The use of negative rates has not proven that they are an effective monetary tool, said Torsten Slok, chief international economist for Deutsche Bank, at the meeting.

Negative rates have produced anxiousness among investors who are seeking greater yield.

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The probability of U.S. banks paying consumers interest on their mortgages even though Danish banks are paying borrowers interest on them remains scant, said David Reiss, a law professor at the Brooklyn Law School. The interest rates of adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) are typically set for the first five or seven year and resets to a new rate. The new interest rate is the combination of an index and a spread with the index often being the London Inter Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR), which has flirted with 0%.

The majority of ARMs have a clause which limits the amount the interest rate can be changed annually, including ones offered by Fannie Mae.

The Fed’s Effect on Mortgage Rates

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Federal Open Market Committee Meeting

Federal Open Market Committee Meeting

DepositAccounts.com quoted me in Types of Institutions in the U.S. Banking System – Investment Banks and Central Banks. It reads, in part,

Central Banks

Think of the central bank as the Grand Poobah of a country’s monetary system. In the U.S. that honor is bestowed upon the Federal Reserve. While there are other important central banks, like the European Central Bank, the Bank of England and the People’s Bank of China. For now, focus stateside.

Think of the central bank as the Grand Poobah of a country’s monetary system. In the U.S. that honor is bestowed upon the Federal Reserve.

The Federal Reserve was created by the Congress to provide the nation with a safer, more flexible, and more stable monetary and financial system. The Federal Reserve was created on December 23, 1913, when President Woodrow Wilson signed the Federal Reserve Act into law. To keep it simple, think of the Fed as having responsibility in these four areas:

  1. conducting the nation’s monetary policy by influencing money and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of full employment and stable prices;
  2. supervising and regulating banks and other important financial institutions to ensure the safety and soundness of the nation’s banking and financial system and to protect the credit rights of consumers;
  3. maintaining the stability of the financial system and containing systemic risk that may arise in financial markets
  4. providing certain financial services to the U.S. government, U.S. financial institutions, and foreign official institutions, and playing a major role in operating and overseeing the nation’s payments systems.

You need look no further than the Federal Reserve FAQs to learn more about how it is structured.

The Federal Reserve may not take your money, but be clear it has much financial impact on your life. Brooklyn Law Professor David Reiss gives one example, “The Federal Reserve can have an impact on the interest rate you pay on your mortgage. Since the financial crisis, the Fed has fostered accommodative financial conditions which kept interest rates low. It has done this a number of ways, including through its monetary policy actions. The Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee sets targets for the federal funds rate. The federal funds rate, in turn, influences interest rates for purchases, refinances and home equity loans.”

Wednesday’s Academic Roundup

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Hypothetically Reforming Fannie and Freddie

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Ben Turner

S&P issued a report, Fannie, Freddie, and the FHLB System: Plus Ca Change . . . The report opens, “Despite reform talk in the years since the U.S. housing crisis, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services believes the likelihood of extraordinary government support for key U.S. housing government­-related entities (GREs) Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system remains “almost certain” in case of need.” (1) Notwithstanding the fact that S&P expects that this extraordinary support will last well into the next presidential administration, S&P “can envisage three “tail risk” scenarios in which such support could become less likely under certain conditions, but view each of these scenarios as improbable.” (1) The three scenarios, which S&P characterizes as plausible, albeit improbable, are

  • An electoral sweep, with favorable macroeconomic conditions and few competing legislative priorities;
  • Court judgments, pursuant to shareholder lawsuits, forcing the legislators’ hand; or
  • A renewed housing market crisis, with one or more of these GREs viewed as more cause than cure. (4)

In the first scenario, “an election gives one party control of all three legislative actors (the president, House of Representatives, and Senate), precluding the need for bipartisan compromise to enact major reforms to Fannie and Freddie via legislation.” (4)

In the second, Fannie and Freddie shareholders win lawsuits that stem from the “U.S. Treasury’s decision to modify, in 2012, the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (PSPAs) governing the terms of its financial support to Fannie and Freddie . . ..” (4)

The final scenario,

is a renewed housing market crisis, on a scale at least similar to that of 2008. Like the other two scenarios, we don’t view this as likely, at least in the coming few years . . . perhaps as a result of the unfortunate confluence of several negative surprises- ­­including, for example, overreaction to Federal Reserve monetary policy normalization, terms­-of­-trade shocks (geopolitical conflicts that cause a rapid and dramatic spike in energy costs, perhaps), fresh financial sector  problems that suddenly tighten the sector’s funding costs, and an abnormally long spell of bad weather. (5)

This seems like a pretty reasonable analysis of the likelihood of reform for Fannie and Freddie. But that should not stop us from bemoaning Congressional inaction on this topic. Obviously, Congress is too ideologically driven to bridge the gap between the left and right, but the likelihood that we are building toward some new kind of crisis increases with time. I can’t improve on S&P’s analysis in this report, but I’m sure unhappy about what it means for the long-term health of our housing finance system.

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Wednesday’s Academic Roundup

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Wednesday’s Academic Roundup

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What Do People Do When Mortgage Payments Drop?

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I went to an interesting presentation today on a technical paper, Monetary Policy Pass-Through: Household Consumption and Voluntary Deleveraging. While the paper (by Marco Di Maggio, Amir Kermani & Rodney Ramcharan) itself is tough for the non-expert, it has some important implications that I discuss below. The abstract reads,

Do households benefit from expansionary monetary policy? We investigate how indebted households’ consumption and saving decisions are affected by anticipated changes in monthly interest payments. We focus on borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages originated between 2005 and 2007 featuring an automatic reset of the interest rate after five years. The monthly payment due from the average borrower falls by 52 percent ($900) upon reset, resulting in an increase in disposable income totaling tens of thousands of dollars over the remaining life of the mortgage. We uncover three patterns. First, the average household increases monthly car purchases by 40 percent ($150) upon reset. Second, this expansionary effect is attenuated by the borrowers’ voluntary deleveraging, as a significant fraction of the increased income is deployed to accelerate debt repayment. Third, the marginal propensity to consume is significantly higher for low income and underwater borrowers. To complement these household-level findings, we employ county-level data to provide evidence that consumption responded more to a reduction in short-term interest rates in counties with a larger fraction of adjustable rate mortgage debt. Our results shed light on the income channel of monetary policy as well as the role of debt rigidity in reducing the effectiveness of monetary policy. (1)

The paper cleverly exploits

the anticipated changes in monthly payments of borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) originated between 2005 and 2007, with a fixed interest rate for the first 5 years, which is automatically adjusted at the end of this initial period. These cohorts experience a sudden and substantial drop in the interest rates they pay upon reset, regardless of their financial position or credit worthiness and without refinancing. These cohorts are of particular interest because the interest rate reduction they experienced is sizeable: the ARMs originated in 2005 benefited from an average reduction of 3 percentage points in the reference interest rate in 2010. (3)

I will leave it to individual readers to work through how they designed this research project and move on to its implications:

The magnitude of the positive income shock for these households is large indeed: the monthly payment falls on average by $900 at the moment of the interest rate adjustment. Potentially, this could free up important resources for these indebted and mainly underwater households. We show that households increase their car purchase spending by more than $150 per month, equivalent to a 40 percent increase compared to the period immediately before the adjustment. Their monthly credit card balances also increase substantially, by almost $200 a month within the first year after the adjustment. Moreover, there is not any sign of intertemporal substitution or reversal within two years of the adjustment. . . . However, we also show that households use 15% of their increase in income to repay their debts faster, almost doubling the extent of this effort. (38-39)

There are all sorts of interesting implications that follow from this study, but I am particularly intrigued by its implications for “debt rigidity — the responsiveness of loan contracts to interest rate changes.” (6) While the authors are interested in how debt rigidity can impact monetary policy, I am interested in how it can impact households. There is much in the American housing finance system that keeps households from refinancing — high title insurance charges and other fees, for instance — but we do not often focus on the impact that rigid mortgage contracts have on the broader economy. This paper demonstrates that the effects are not borne by consumers alone. This paper quantifies the effects on the consumer economy to some extent and reveals that they are quite significant. Policy makers should take note of just how significant they can be.