Tag Archives: mortgage insurance

Fannie and Freddie’s Credit Risk Transfers

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The Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center has released its February 2017 Housing Finance at a Glance Chartbook, always a great resource for housing geeks. Each Chartbook highlights one topic. This one focuses on GSE credit risk transfers, an important but technical subject:

The GSE’s credit risk transfer (CRT) program is growing and tapping into a more diverse investor base, reducing the costs of CRTs and improving liquidity in this market. At the same time, the continued reliance on back-end transactions is cause for concern
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Freddie Mac‘s first two capital markets CRT transactions of 2017 have been different from previous Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) transactions in one important way. Unlike the pre-2017 deals, in which the first loss piece (Tranche B) was 100 basis points thick, the first loss piece (Tranche B2) in the latest transactions is only 50 basis points thick while second loss piece (B1) is also 50 basis points thick. Splitting the old B tranche more granularly in this manner is a noteworthy development for a few reasons.
Although this is hardly the first improvement the GSEs have made to their back-end CRT execution, it is an important one. Splitting the offering into more granular risk buckets will force investors to price the tranches more accurately, thus facilitating more precise price discovery of credit risk. More granular tranching will also help increase the demand for STACR securities. Investors who were previously willing, but unable to invest in the B tranche because investment guidelines prohibited them from taking first loss credit risk will now instead be able to invest in the second loss B1 tranche, which offers a higher expected returns than the previous second loss tranche (M2). Growing and diversifying the investor base is important because it makes the bidding process more efficient and minimizes the cost of risk transfer for Freddie Mac and the taxpayer. A larger, more diverse investor base also bodes well for the liquidity of the CRT market, which is still in its infancy.
Clearly, these innovations are important steps towards improving the efficiency of back-end CRT. But at the same time, they must be viewed in the context of the broader objectives of credit risk transfer and housing finance reform which have near unanimous support: reducing taxpayer risk, passing the benefits of CRT on to borrowers, facilitating broad availability of credit through the economic cycle, ensuring adequate access for lenders of all sizes, and promoting a variety of CRT executions, including at the front end to facilitate an understanding of which programs are most favorable under which circumstances.
Although the GSEs have experimented with front end mechanisms like lender recourse and deeper MI, these transactions have been few and far between, and with very little transparency about pricing and other terms. But more importantly, the GSEs’ continued and significant reliance on back-end capital markets transactions doesn’t put us on a path towards achieving some of the program objectives outlined above. This matters because it signals that the GSEs’ current strategy for credit risk transfer, which revolves largely around the success of back-end transactions, may ultimately keep the program from realizing its full potential. (5)
 So, all in all Fannie and Freddie are taking a step in the right direction, but it is just a small step on the road to housing finance reform.

Mortgage Bankers and GSE Reform

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photo by Daniel Case

The Mortgage Bankers Association has released GSE Reform Principles and Guardrails. It opens,

This paper serves as an introduction to MBA’s recommended approach to GSE reform. Its purpose is to outline what MBA views as the key components of an end state, the principles that MBA believes should be incorporated in any future system, the “guardrails” we believe are necessary in our end state, as well as emphasize the need to ensure a smooth transition to the new secondary mortgage market. (1)

While there is very little that is new in this document, it is useful, nonetheless, as a statement of the industry’s position. The MBA has promulgated the following principles for housing finance reform:

  • The 30-year, fixed-rate, pre-payable single-family mortgage and longterm financing for multifamily mortgages should be preserved.
  • A deep, liquid TBA market for conventional single-family loans must be maintained. Eligible MBS backed by a well-defined pool of single-family mortgages or multifamily mortgages should receive an explicit government guarantee, funded by appropriately priced insurance premiums, to attract global capital and preserve liquidity during times of stress. The government guarantee should attach to the eligible MBS only, not to the guarantors or their debt.
  • The availability of affordable housing, both owned and rented, is vitally important; these needs should be addressed along a continuum, incorporating both single- and multifamily approaches for homeowners and renters.
  • The end-state system should facilitate equitable, transparent and direct access to secondary market programs for lenders of all sizes and business models.
  • A robust, innovative and purely private market should be able to co-exist alongside the government-backed market.
  • Existing multifamily financing executions should be preserved, and new options should be permitted.
  • The end-state system should rely on strong, transparent regulation and private capital (including primary-market credit enhancement such as mortgage insurance [MI] and lender recourse, or other available forms of credit risk transfer) primarily assuming most of the risk.
  • While the system will primarily rely on private capital, there should be a provision for a deeper level of government support in the event of a systemic crisis.
  • There should be a “bright line” between the primary and secondary mortgage markets, applying to both allowable activities and scope of regulation.
  • Transition risks to the new end-state model should be minimized, with special attention given to avoiding any operational disruptions. (3-4)

This set of principles reflect the bipartisan consensus that had been developing around the Johnson-Crapo and Corker-Warner housing reform bills. The ten trillion dollar question, of course, is whether the Trump Administration and Congressional leaders like Jeb Hensarling (R-TX), the Chair of the House Banking Committee, are going to go along with the mortgage finance industry on this or whether they will push for a system with far less government involvement than is contemplated by the MBA.

Ensuring Sustainable Homeownership

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My short article, Ensuring That Homeownership Is Sustainable, was just published in the Westlaw Journal, Bank & Lender Liability. It opens,

The Federal Housing Administration has suffered as a result of many of the same unrealistic underwriting assumptions that led to problems for many lenders during the 2000s. It, too, was harmed by a housing market as bad as any since the Great Depression.

As a result, the federal government announced in 2013 that the FHA would require the first bailout in the agency’s history. While facing financial challenges, the FHA has also come under attack for the poor execution of policies designed to expand homeownership opportunities.

Leading commentators have called for the federal government to stop having the FHA do anything but provide liquidity to the low end of the mortgage market.

These critics rely on a few examples of agency programs that were clearly failures, but they do not address the FHA’s long history of undertaking comparable initiatives.

 In fact, the FHA has a history of successfully undertaking new homeownership programs. However, it also has operational flaws that should be addressed before it undertakes similar future homeownership initiatives.

INTRODUCTION TO THE FHA

Mortgage insurance is a product that is paid for by the homeowner but protects the lender if the homeowner defaults on the mortgage. The insurer pays the lender for losses it suffers from the homeowner’s default. Mortgage insurance is typically required for borrowers who have limited funds for down payments.

The FHA provides mortgage insurance for loans on single family and multifamily homes, and it is the world’s largest government mortgage insurer. Other significant providers are the Department of Veterans Affairs and private companies known as private mortgage insurers.

Mortgage insurance makes homeownership possible for many households that would otherwise not be able to meet lenders’ underwriting requirements.

Just like much of the federal housing infrastructure, the FHA has its roots in the Great Depression. The private mortgage insurance industry, like many others, was decimated in the early 1930s. Companies in the industry began to fail as almost half of all mortgages went into default. The government created the FHA to replace the PMI industry, which remained dormant for decades.

In the Great Depression, the housing markets faced problems that were similar to those faced by the same markets in the late 2000s. These problems included rapidly falling housing prices, widespread unemployment and underemployment, the rapid tightening of credit and — as a result of all of those trends — much higher default and foreclosure rates.

The FHA noted in its second annual report, issued in 1936, that the “shortcomings of the old system need no recital. It financed extensive overselling of houses at inflated values, to borrowers unable to pay for them.” Needless to say, the same could be said of our most recent housing bust.

Over its lifetime, the FHA has insured more than 40 million mortgages, helping to make homeownership available to a broad swath of American households. Indeed, the FHA mortgage has been essential to America’s transformation from a nation of renters to one of homeowners.

The early FHA created the modern American housing finance system, as well as the look and feel of post-war suburban communities through the construction standards the agency set for the new houses it insured.

The FHA has also had many other missions over the course of its existence — and a varied legacy to match.

Beginning in the 1950s, the FHA’s role changed from serving the entire mortgage market to focusing on certain segments. This changed mission had a major impact on everything the FHA did, including how it underwrote mortgage insurance and for whom it did so.

In recent years, the FHA has come under attack for poorly executing some of its attempts to expand homeownership opportunities, and leading commentators have called for the federal government to stop assigning such mandates to the agency. They argue that the FHA should focus only on providing liquidity for the portion of the mortgage market that serves low- and moderate-income households.

These critics rely on a couple of examples of failed programs, such as the Section 235 program enacted as part of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 and the American Dream Downpayment Assistance Act of 2003.

Those programs required borrowers to make only tiny and sometimes even nominal down payments. The government enacted the Section 235 program in response to the riots that burned through American cities in the 1960s. It was intended to expand homeownership opportunities for low-income households, particularly black ones.

The American Dream program was also geared to increasing homeownership among lower-income and minority households. The crux of the critique of these programs is that they failed to ensure that borrowers had the capacity to repay their mortgages, leading to bad results for the FHA and borrowers alike.

Notwithstanding these failed initiatives, the FHA has a parallel history of successfully undertaking new homeownership programs. These successes include programs for veterans returning home from World War II, a mission that was later handed off to the VA.

At the same time, historically the FHA has clearly suffered from operational failures that should be addressed in the design of any future initiatives.

Unfortunately, the agency has not really grappled with its past failures as it moves beyond the financial crisis. To properly address operational failures, the FHA must first identify its goals. (6-7, footnote omitted)

Preserving Affordable Housing

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photo by Rgkleit

Alexander von Hoffman of the Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies has posted an interesting working paper, To Preserve Affordable Housing in the United States. It opens,

Most Americans who have any idea about low-income housing policy in the United States think of it as composed of programs that either build and manage residences – such as public housing – or help pay the rent – such as rental vouchers. Few people realize that much, perhaps most, of the government’s effort to house poor families and individuals is now devoted to supporting privately owned buildings that, courtesy of government subsidies, already provide low-income housing. Similarly, few know of the national movement to prevent these rental homes from being converted to market-rate housing or demolished and to keep them affordable and available to low-income households.

The problem of “preservation of affordable housing” generally refers to privately owned but government-subsidized dwellings developed under a particular set of federal subsidy programs. Although the first of these programs was enacted in 1959, their heyday – when they produced the bulk of government-subsidized low-income housing – lasted from the late 1960s until the mid-1980s. Before these programs were adopted, the government’s chief low-income housing program had been public housing, in which government agencies funded, developed, owned, leased, and managed apartments for people of limited incomes on a permanent basis.

Starting about 1960, however, the government shifted to a new policy in which it provided subsidies limited to a specific length of time to private developers of low-income rental housing. These private developers could be nonprofit organizations or for-profit companies operating through entities that earned limited dividends. In the low-income rental programs of the 1960s the government subsidized the rents of poor tenants by providing low-interest mortgage loans (through mortgage insurance and/or direct payments) to the projects’ developers. In 1974, Congress added another program, Section 8, in which the government signed a contract to pay a portion of the tenants’ rents for up to twenty years, which was as long as the mortgage subsidies had been.

After the low-income rental projects were completed, a number of circumstances threatened to displace the projects’ low-income occupants from their homes. In the early years especially, some owners faced financial difficulties, including foreclosures. Starting in the boom years of the 1980s, others desired to pay back their subsidized mortgages early (or “prepay”) to rent or sell the apartments at lucrative market rates. And eventually all owners reached the end of the time limit of their original subsidies. To keep low-income tenants in the subsidized apartments, housing advocates fought to keep the subsidized projects livable and within the means of poor people. The cause they rallied to was the “preservation of affordable housing.”

*    *    *

Since the late 1980s a wide array of interests – including for-profit owners and investors, non-profit developers and managers, and tenants – have organized their interest-group associations and entered into coalitions with one another to shape government policies. They have worked with sympathetic members of Congress and their aides to preserve the subsidized housing stock for low-income Americans. The road has been rough at times. The Reagan administration was indifferent at best to the issue. Legislation in 1987 and 1990 for all practical purposes banned prepayments, angering the owners’ representatives who opposed these laws. After prepayments were again allowed, advocates and owners joined together again to push for affordable housing preservation programs and procedures. The government programs that they attained in the 1990s became a major component of low-income housing policy in the United States.

Until relatively recently, the interest groups focused on shaping federal policy. They worked to pass – or repeal – national legislation and to influence program rules set by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Although the federal government continues to be essential to housing policy, the growing political opposition to large federal spending programs has led advocates of affordable housing preservation to press state governments for financial support. (3-5)

This working paper clearly identifies the problems with “[p]oorly thought out programs” that “encouraged bad underwriting and long-term management” and how they played out in affordable housing projects that were not intended to provide for permanent affordability. (73) It also provides a good foundation for a discussion of where affordable housing policy should be heading now.

Testing CFPB’s Constitutionality

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by Junius Brutus Stearns

Law360 quoted me in PHH Case Poised To Test CFPB’s Constitutionality (behind a paywall). It opens,

A battle over the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s interpretation of mortgage regulations in assessing a $109 million penalty against a New Jersey-based mortgage firm has morphed into a fight over the authority vested in the bureau’s director that could reshape the consumer finance watchdog, experts say.

The appeal from PHH Corp. to the D.C. Circuit originally centered on CFPB Director Richard Cordray’s decision to dramatically hike a $6 million mortgage insurance kickback penalty issued by an administrative law judge against a company subsidiary, to the final, $109 million figure. But the judges hearing the case warned the bureau to prepare to answer questions at oral arguments Tuesday about language in the Dodd-Frank Act that says the president could remove the CFPB director only for cause, and about how the court should view an administrative agency led by a single director rather than the more typical commission structure.

Those questions have been hanging over the CFPB since its inception in the 2010 law, and if the D.C. Circuit rules against the bureau, that could fundamentally alter the way the bureau operates, said Jonathan Pompan, a partner at Venable LLP.

Cordray “is potentially going to have to address questions that go to the core of his authority, which really hadn’t been at the forefront of the PHH case until now,” he said.

Challenges to the CFPB’s constitutionality are not new. Everything from the bureau’s single-director rather than commission structure to the agency’s funding through the Federal Reserve’s budget rather than the congressional appropriations process have been constant refrains for the CFPB’s opponents.

Those concerns have been addressed through legislation aimed at curtailing the CFPB’s power, and claims challenging the agency’s constitutionality have been an almost pro forma rite of any litigation involving the bureau.

Up until now, however, those complaints and attempts to curb the CFPB have gone nowhere.

So it was a surprise when the D.C. Circuit last Wednesday told the bureau’s attorneys to be prepared to face questions about whether Dodd-Frank’s provision stating that the president can remove the CFPB director only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” passed constitutional muster.

The panel, made up of three Republican appointees led by U.S. Circuit Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh, is also seeking answers about potential remedies for any problems that that provision brings, including potentially removing it from the statute and allowing the president to remove the CFPB director without any specific cause.

The judges also want to know how any fix to the problem, if they determine there is one, would affect the CFPB director’s authority.

“This is not, by any stretch of the imagination, idle thinking on their part,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

The questions being posed by the D.C. Circuit panel do not pose the same level of threat that the other constitutional challenges the CFPB could potentially face would, but it is certainly a more defining question than what most observers thought the case would be about.

PHH is challenging Cordray’s interpretation of violations under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act that allowed him to supersize a $6 million penalty handed down by an administrative law judge, to the $109 million that the CFPB director handed down when PHH appealed.

But the arguments set for Tuesday are expected to go far beyond that issue.

There will be the central question of whether the U.S. Constitution allows Congress to put in restrictions on when the president can fire officials at an administrative agency. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed these issues in the 2010 Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board decision, which affirmed a D.C. Circuit ruling that such protections were constitutional.

Judge Kavanaugh cast a dissenting vote in that case, stating that a president should not have to notify Congress as to why the director of an administrative agency is removed.

“If the challenges were going to be taken seriously anywhere, it was probably going to be this panel,” said Brian Simmonds Marshall, policy counsel at Americans for Financial Reform, which seeks tougher banking regulations.

Removing that provision from the statute, should the D.C. Circuit elect to do so, could limit the CFPB’s independence, as well as that of other administrative agencies for which statute requires a reason for the dismissal of officials, he said.

“The CFPB doesn’t have to check with the White House right now before it brings an enforcement action,” Simmonds Marshall said.

Another case that will be heavily scrutinized will be a 1935 Supreme Court decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S., which allowed for restrictions on the removal of Federal Trade Commission commissioners.

The CFPB relied heavily on that case in its filings with the D.C. Circuit, noted Benjamin Saul, a partner at White & Case LLP.

“I’ll be looking for the questions being driven by Judge Kavanaugh and his comments from the bench, particularly on the Humphrey’s case,” Saul said.

Whether the arguments focus mostly on the constitutional questions about the ability to remove the CFPB director or on remedies to fix that could also indicate where the court is headed on these questions, according to Reiss.

“It does sound that they’re searching for remedies that are not earth-shattering remedies,” Reiss said.

Underwriting Sustainable Homeownership

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Mesa-Mesa Journal-Tribune FHA Demonstration Home-1925" by Marine 69-71

I have posted Underwriting Sustainable Homeownership: The Federal Housing Administration and the Low Down Payment Loan to SSRN (and to BePress). It is forthcoming in the Georgia Law Review. The abstract reads,

The United States Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) has been a versatile tool of government since it was created during the Great Depression. The FHA was created in large part to inject liquidity into a moribund mortgage market. It succeeded wonderfully, with rapid growth during the late 1930s. The federal government repositioned it a number of times over the following decades to achieve a variety of additional social goals. These goals included supporting civilian mobilization during World War II; helping veterans returning from the War; stabilizing urban housing markets during the 1960s; and expanding minority homeownership rates during the 1990s. It achieved success with some of its goals and had a terrible record with others. More recently, the FHA is in the worst financial shape it has ever been in.

Today’s FHA suffers from many of the same unrealistic underwriting assumptions that have done in so many other lenders during the 2000s. It has also been harmed, like other lenders, by a housing market as bad as any seen since the Great Depression. As a result, the federal government recently announced the first bailout of the FHA in its history. At the same time that it has faced these financial challenges, the FHA has also come under attack for the poor execution of some of its policies to expand homeownership. Leading commentators have called for the federal government to stop using the FHA to do anything other than provide liquidity to the low end of the mortgage market. These critics rely on a couple of examples of programs that were clearly failures but they do not address the FHA’s long history of undertaking comparable initiatives. This article takes the long view and demonstrates that the FHA has a history of successfully undertaking new homeownership programs. At the same time, the article identifies flaws in the FHA model that should be addressed in order to prevent them from occurring if the FHA were to undertake similar initiatives in the future.

In order to demonstrate this, the article first sets forth the dominant critique of the FHA. Relying on often overlooked primary sources, it then sets forth a history of the FHA and charts its constantly changing roles in the housing finance sector. In order to give a more detailed picture of the federal government’s role in housing finance, the article also incorporates the scholarly literature regarding (i) the intersection of race and housing policy and (ii) the economics and finance literature regarding the role that down payments play in the appropriate underwriting of mortgages for low- and moderate-income households. The article concludes that the FHA can responsibly address objectives other than the provision of liquidity to the residential mortgage market. It further proposes that FHA homeownership programs for low- and moderate-income families should be required to balance access to credit with households’ ability to make their mortgage payments over the long term. Such a proposal will ensure that the FHA extends credit responsibly to low- and moderate-income households while minimizing the likelihood of future bailouts.

Reiss on Big Kickback Penalty

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Richard_Cordray

Law360 quoted me in CFPB Ruling Adds New Front In Administrative Law Fight (behind a paywall). The story opens,

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Director Richard Cordray’s decision last week upholding an administrative ruling against PHH Mortgage Corp. and jacking up the firm’s penalty highlights concerns industry has about the bureau’s appeals process, and it adds to a growing battle over federal agencies’ administrative proceedings.

Cordray’s June 4 decision in the PHH case marked the first time the bureau’s administrative appeals process was put to the test. And the result highlighted both the power that Cordray has as sole adjudicator in such an appeal and his willingness to review a decision independently and go against his enforcement team, at least in part, experts say.

But because PHH has already vowed to appeal the decision, the structure of the CFPB’s appeals process could be put in play, and it could be forced to change — a battle that comes as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is also facing challenges to its administrative proceedings.

The way the CFPB handles administrative appeals “might be one of the issues that the court of appeals might be asked to consider,” said Benjamin Diehl, special counsel at Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP.

In the case before Cordray, PHH had been seeking to overturn an administrative law judge’s November 2014 decision that found it had engaged in a mortgage insurance kickback scheme under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, or RESPA.

Cordray agreed with the underlying decision, but he found that Administrative Law Judge Cameron Elliot incorrectly applied the law’s provisions when assessing the penalty PHH should face.

And when Cordray applied those provisions in a way that he found to be correct, PHH’s penalty soared from around $6.4 million to $109 million, according to the ruling.

The reasoning behind Cordray’s decision irked lenders, which say the CFPB director dismissed precedent on mortgage reinsurance, including policies from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and judicial interpretations of the statute of limitations on RESPA claims.

“If the rules are going to change because an agency can wave a magic wand and change them, that’s disconcerting,” Foley & Lardner LLP partner Jay N. Varon said.

The rise in penalties highlighted both the risk that firms face in an appeal before the CFPB and Cordray’s desire to send a message to companies that he believes violate the law, said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

“It is unsurprising that Cordray would take a position that is intended to have a significant deterrent effect on those who violate RESPA, and I expect that he wanted to signal as much in this, his first decision in an appeal of an administrative enforcement proceeding,” Reiss said.