Tag Archives: New Century

Surveying Mortgage Originations, Going Forward

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REFinBlog has been nominated for the second year in a row for The Expert Institute’s Best Legal Blog Competition in the Education Category.  Please vote here if you like what you read.

As I had earlier noted, the Federal Housing Finance Agency has issued a request for comments on the National Survey of Mortgage Originations (NSMO).  The NSMO is “a recurring quarterly survey of individuals who have recently obtained a loan secured by a first mortgage on single-family residential property.” (81 F.R. 62889) I submitted my comment, written in the context of the newly-elected Trump Administration. It reads, in part,

I write to support this proposed collection, but also to raise some concerns about its efficacy.

The NSMO is very important to the health of the mortgage market.  We need only look at the Subprime Boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s to see why this is true:  subprime mortgages went from “making up a tiny portion of new mortgage originations in the early 1990s” to  “40 percent of newly originated securitized mortgages in 2006.” David Reiss, Regulation of Subprime and Predatory Lending, International Encyclopedia of Housing and Home (2010). During the Boom, subprime lenders like Countrywide changed mortgage characteristics so quickly that information about new originations became outdated within months.See generally Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 105 (2011) (“Countrywide was not unique: Ameriquest, New Century, Washington Mutual, and others all pursued loans as aggressively. They competed by originating types of mortgages created years before as niche products, but now transformed into riskier, mass-market versions”) Policymakers and academics did not have good access to the newest data and thus were operating, to a large extent, in the dark.  The information in the NSMO will therefore not only help regulators, but will also assist outside researchers to “more effectively monitor emerging trends in the mortgage origination process . . ..” (81 F.R. 62890)

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there is no question that this “collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of FHFA functions . . ..” (81 F.R. 62890) Given the likely changes to the federal role in the mortgage markets over the next four years, the NSMO can provide critical insight into whether homeowners feel that that market serves their needs.

The Sloppy State of the Mortgage Market

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I published a short article in the California Real Property Law Reporter, Sloppy, Sloppy, Sloppy: The State of the Mortgage Market, as part of a broader discussion of Foreclosures Following Problematic Securitizations.  The other contributors were Roger Bernhardt, who organized the discussion,  as well as Dale Whitman, Steven Bender, April Charney and Joseph Forte.  My article opens,

Much of the discussion about the recent California Supreme Court case Yvanova v New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 C4th 919  has focused on the scope of the Court’s narrow holding, “a borrower who has suffered a nonjudicial foreclosure [in California] does not lack standing to sue for wrongful foreclosure based on an allegedly void assignment merely because he or she was in default on the loan and was not a party to the challenged assignment.” 62 C4th at 924. This is an important question, no doubt, but I want to spend a little time contemplating the types of sloppy behavior at issue in the case and what consequences should result from that behavior.

Sloppy Practices All Over

The lender in Yvanova was the infamous New Century Mortgage Corporation, once the second-largest subprime lender in the nation.  New Century was so infamous that it even had a cameo role in the recently released movie, The Big Short, in which its 2007 bankruptcy filing marked the turning point in the market’s understanding of the fundamentally diseased condition of the subprime market.

New Century was infamous for its “brazen” behavior.  The Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (Jan. 2011) (Report) labeled it so because of its aggressive origination practices.  See Report at page 186. It noted that New Century “ignored early warnings that its own loan quality was deteriorating and stripped power from two risk-control departments that had noted the evidence.” Report at p 157. And it quotes a former New Century fraud specialist as saying, “[t]he definition of a good loan changed from ‘one that pays’ to ‘one that could be sold.”  Report at p 105.

This type of brazen behavior was endemic throughout the mortgage industry during the subprime boom in the early 2000s.  As Brad Borden and I have documented, Wall Street firms flagrantly disregarded the real estate mortgage investment conduit (REMIC) rules and regulations that must be complied with to receive favorable tax treatment for a mortgage-backed security, although the IRS has let them dodge this particular bullet.  Borden & Reiss, REMIC Tax Enforcement as Financial-Market Regulator, 16 U Penn J Bus L 663 (Spring 2014).

The sloppy practices were not limited to the origination of mortgages. They were prevalent in the servicing of them as well. The National Mortgage Settlement entered into in February 2012, by 49 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government, on the one hand, and the country’s five largest mortgage servicers, on the other, provided for over $50 billion in relief for distressed borrowers and in payments to the government entities. While this settlement was a significant hit for the industry, industry sloppy practices were not ended by it. For information about the Settlement, see Joint State-Federal National Mortgage Servicing Settlements and the State of California Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Mortgage Settlements: Homeowners.

As the subprime crisis devolved into the foreclosure crisis, we have seen those sloppy practices have persisted through the lifecycle of the subprime mortgage, with case after case revealing horrifically awful behavior on the part of lenders and servicers in foreclosure proceedings.  I have written about many of these Kafka-esque cases on REFinBlog.com.  One typical case describes how borrowers have “been through hell” in dealing with their mortgage servicer. U.S. Bank v Sawyer (2014) 95 A3d 608, 612 n5.  Another typical case found that a servicer committed the tort of outrage because its “conduct, if proven, is beyond the bounds of decency and utterly intolerable in our community.” Lucero v Cenlar, FSB (WD Wash 2014) 2014 WL 4925489, *7.  And Yvanova alleges more of the same.

Challenging Wrongful Foreclosures

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The California Supreme Court issued an opinion a few days ago that has been getting a lot of attention, Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp., S218973 (Feb. 18, 2016). The opinion opens by noting that

The collapse in 2008 of the housing bubble and its accompanying system of home loan securitization led, among other consequences, to a great national wave of loan defaults and foreclosures. One key legal issue arising out of the collapse was whether and how defaulting homeowners could challenge the validity of the chain of assignments involved in securitization of their loans. (1)

The Court concludes that

a home loan borrower has standing to claim a nonjudicial foreclosure was wrongful because an assignment by which the foreclosing party purportedly took a beneficial interest in the deed of trust was not merely voidable but void, depriving the foreclosing party of any legitimate authority to order a trustee’s sale. (30)

First, let us be clear what it is NOT saying: “We do not hold or suggest that a borrower may attempt to preempt a threatened nonjudicial foreclosure by a suit questioning the foreclosing party’s right to proceed.” (2) This is an important distinction between challenging a nonjudicial foreclosure and having standing to bring a wrongful foreclosure tort action.

And let us be clear as to what it is saying: if a homeowner argues that that an assignment of a deed of trust is void, that can provide the basis for a wrongful foreclosure action because it “is no mere ‘procedural nicety,’ from a contractual point of view, to insist that only those with authority to foreclose on a borrower be permitted to do so.” (22) Quoting Adam Levitin, the Court finds that

“Such a view fundamentally misunderstands the mortgage contract. The mortgage contract is not simply an agreement that the home may be sold upon a default on the loan. Instead, it is an agreement that if the homeowner defaults on the loan, the mortgagee may sell the property pursuant to the requisite legal procedure.” (23, italics changed)

Sounds like common sense to me.

 

Seeking Justice Through Litigation

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Judge Caproni (SDNY) issued an Opinion and Order in Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, No. 12-CV-7667 (May 14, 2015). It opens,

This is one of many cases arising out of the collapse of the housing market. This one comes with a twist: homeowners in Detroit who received subprime loans seek to hold a single investment bank responsible under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) for discriminating against African-American borrowers, based on their claim that African-Americans were more likely than similarly-situated white borrowers to receive so-called “Combined-Risk loans.” Plaintiffs allege that Morgan Stanley so infected the market for residential mortgages — and for mortgages written by New Century Mortgage Company, a now defunct loan originator, in particular — that it bears responsibility for the disparate impact of New Century’s lending practices. Although Plaintiffs advance creative theories, their class action lawsuit founders on the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. (1-2, footnote omitted)

Judge Caproni notes that she is “not unsympathetic to Plaintiff’s claims,” she concludes that this class action lawsuit is an inappropriate vehicle to rectify the wrong that Plaintiffs allege Morgan Stanley perpetrated.” (2) I am not an expert on the law of class actions, but the opinion does seem to identify a number of ways in which the proposed class is “unworkable.” (2)

We are now nearly ten years in from the start of the financial crisis and it seems like we can get a broad sense of whether justice has been served.  My instinct is that many people would say “No,” a resounding “No!”

At first glance that might seem odd, particularly to the shareholders and management of financial institutions who have paid tens of billions of dollars in fines and judgments. But there is a strong sense that those who have been harmed have not been able to get their day in court with those who did the harming. A case like this reveals the limitations of litigation as a means for seeking justice. Not every injustice is capable of being remedied in a court of law.

What does this tell us about preparing for the aftermath of the next crisis? How can laws be changed now to ensure that the right people and institutions are held accountable when it hits? While there are no easy answers to these questions, lawmakers should consider whether the scope of organizational liability is properly defined, whether agents of organizations are properly held accountable and whether organizations working in tandem with each other can be properly held accountable for the harms that they cause collectively. Easier said than done, I know, but still worth the effort.

Racial Discrimination in the Secondary Mortgage Market

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Judge Baer issued an opinion in Adkins et al. v. Morgan Stanley et al., No 1:12-cv-07667 (July 25, 2013), denying Morgan Stanley’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff-homeowners’ Fair Housing Act claims. The homeowners claimed “that Morgan Stanley’s policies and practices caused New Century Mortgage Company to target borrowers in the Detroit, Michigan region for loans that had a disparate impact upon African-Americans” in violation of the FHA. (1)

The Court found that the plaintiffs met their pleading burden sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss:

First, they have identified the policy that they allege has a disproportionate impact on minorities.  That policy consisted of Morgan Stanley

(1) routinely purchasing both stated income loans and loans with unreasonably high debt-to-income ratios,

(2) routinely purchasing loans with unreasonably high loan-to-value ratios,

(3) requiring that New Century’s loans include adjustable rates and prepayment penalties as well as purchasing loans with other high-risk features,

(4) providing necessary funding to New Century, and

(5) purchasing loans that deviated from basic underwriting standards.

Plaintiffs go on to state that these policies resulted in “New Century aggressively target[ing] African-American borrowers and communities . . . for the Combined-Risk Loans.”  (Compl. ¶ 81.) Indeed, Plaintiffs allege in detail the effect that New Century’s lending had upon the African-American community in the Detroit area. (Compl. ¶¶ 115–122).  That lending, according to Plaintiffs, was a direct result of Morgan Stanley’s policies.  And while Plaintiffs do not allege that they qualified for better loans, they allege discrimination based only upon the receipt of these predatory, toxic loans that placed them at high financial risk.  These risks exist regardless of Plaintiffs’ qualifications.  On a motion to dismiss, these allegations are sufficient to demonstrate a disparate impact. (11)

The opinion goes farther afield than the questions presented at points. For instance, Judge Baer writes,

Detroit’s recent bankruptcy filing only emphasizes the broader consequences of predatory lending and the foreclosures that inevitably result.  Indeed, “[b]y 2012, banks had foreclosed on 100,000 homes [in Detroit], which drove down the city’s total real estate value by 30 percent and spurred a mass exodus of nearly a quarter million people.”  Laura Gottesdiener, Detroit’s Debt Crisis:  Everything Must Go, Rolling Stone, June 20, 2013.  The resulting blight stemming from “60,000 parcels of vacant land” and “78,000 vacant structures, of which 38,000 are estimated to be in potentially dangerous condition” has further strained Detroit’s already taxed resources.  Kevyn D. Orr, Financial and Operating Plan 9 (2013).  And as residents flee the city, Detroit’s shrinking ratepayer base renders its financial outlook even bleaker.  Id.  Given these conditions, it is not difficult to conclude that Detroit’s current predicament, at least in part, is an outgrowth of the predatory lending at issue here.  See Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles Into Insolvency, N.Y. Times, July 18, 2013, at A1 (listing Detroit’s “shrunken tax base but still a huge, 139-square-mile city to maintain” as one factor contributing to the city’s financial woes). (3-4)

This kind of judicial history does not seem to speak to the legal issue at hand and may negatively impact its reception on appeal. Furthermore, all Fair Housing Act cases will be impacted by the Supreme Court’s decision in Mount Holly v. Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. for which it has recently granted cert. In that case, the Supreme Court will decide whether disparate impact is a cognizable claim under the Fair Housing Act.

But, whatever happens in the future, Adkins proceeds apace for now.