CFPB Mortgage Highlights Fall ’15

Mike Licht

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau released its Fall 2015 Supervisory Highlights. In the context of mortgage origination, the CFPB found that

supervised entities, in general, effectively implemented and demonstrated compliance with the rule changes, there were instances of non-compliance with certain [rules] . . .. There were also findings of violations of disclosure requirements pursuant to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), implemented by Regulation X; the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), implemented by Regulation Z; and consumer financial privacy rules, implemented by Regulation P. (9, footnotes and sources omitted).

Specifically, it found that one or more entities failed to

  • “fully comply with the requirement that charges at settlement not exceed amounts on the good faith estimate by more than specified tolerances.” (10)
  • comply with the regulations governing HUD-1 settlement statements because of fees on the HUD-1 did match those on invoices; improper calculations on the HUD-1; and fees charged for services that were not provided, among other things.
  • provide required disclosures.
  • reimburse borrowers for understated APRs and finance charges, as required by Regulation Z.

In the context of mortgage servicing, the CFPB found that while it

continues to be concerned about the range of legal violations identified at various mortgage servicers, it also recognizes efforts made by certain servicers to develop an adequate compliance position through increased resources devoted to compliance. . . . Supervision continues to see that the inadequacies of outdated or deficient systems pose considerable compliance risk for mortgage servicers, and that improvements and investments in these systems can be essential to achieving an adequate compliance position. (15)

This is all well and good, but as I have noted before, it is hard to estimate how much of a problem exists from such a report — one or more entities did this, we are concerned about a range of legal violations of that . . .. I understand that the CFPB’s primary audience for this report are CFPB-supervised entities concerned with the CFPB’s regulatory focus, but this approach barely rises to the level of anecdote for the rest of us.

The End of Private-Label Securities?

Steve Jurvetson

Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase

J.P. Morgan’s Securitized Products Weekly has a report, Proposed FRTB Ruling Endangers ABS, CMBS and Non-Agency RMBS Markets. This is one of those technical studies that have a lot of real world relevance to those of us concerned about the housing markets more generally.

The report analyzes proposed capital rules contained in the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB). JPMorgan believes that these proposed rules would make the secondary trading in residential mortgage-backed securities unprofitable. It also believes that “there is no sector that escapes unscathed; capital will rise dramatically across all securitized product sectors, except agency MBS.” (1) It concludes that “[u]ltimately, in its current form, the FRTB would damage the availability of credit to consumers, reduce lending activity in the form of commercial mortgage and set back private securitization, entrenching the GSEs as the primary securitization vehicle in the residential mortgage market.” (1)

JPMorgan finds that the the impact of these proposed regulations on non-agency residential-mortgage backed securities (jumbos and otherwise) “is so onerous that we wonder if this was the actual intent of the regulators.” Without getting too technical, the authors thought “that the regulators simply had a mathematical mistake in their calculation (and were off by a factor of 100, but unfortunately this is what was intended.” (4) Because these capital rules “would make it highly unattractive for dealers to hold inventory in non-agency securities,” JPMorgan believes that they threaten the entire non-agency RMBS market. (5)

The report concludes with a policy takeaway:

Policymakers have at various times advocated for GSE reform in which the private sector (and private capital) would play a larger role. However, with such high capital requirements under the proposal — compared with capital advantages for GSE securities and a negligible amount of capital for the GSEs themselves — we believe this proposal would significantly set back private securitization, entrenching the GSEs as the primary securitization vehicle in the mortgage market. (5, emphasis removed)

I am not aware if JPMorgan’s concerns are broadly held, so it would important to hear others weigh in on this topic.

If the proposed rule is adopted, it is likely not to be implemented for a few years.  As a result, there is plenty of time to get the right balance between safety and soundness on the one hand and credit availability on the other. While the private-label sector has been a source of trouble in the past, particularly during the subprime boom, it is not in the public interest to put an end to it:  it has provided capital to the jumbo sector and provides much needed competition to Fannie, Freddie and Ginnie.

Tuesday’s Regulatory & Legislative Update

  • The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has finalized a Rule to expand reporting requirements imposed upon financial institutions under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). Dodd-Frank included a mandate directing the CFPB to collect metrics to allow, among other things, a better understanding of the mortgage market, quicker identification of trends, and spotting of discriminatory patterns and practices. The CFPB also hopes to use the data to avoid some of the mistakes in the mortgage market which led to the Financial Crisis.  The CFPB also has a site containing resources to help financial institutions comply.
  • CFPB has released the prepared remarks of Director Richard Corday, which he delivered before the Mortgage Bankers Association’s Annual Convention. In discussing the new agency’s work since Dodd-Frank, Corday asserted that the CFPB has worked hard to create a “set of rules that protect prospective homebuyers in a manner that never existed in the past, while supporting responsible lenders against those who led a race to the bottom in underwriting standards.  We now have a system in place that consumers can trust in a way they could not trust in the marketplace a decade ago.”
  • The Terwilliger Foundation hosted a Housing Summit in New Hampshire where Presidential Hopefuls, including, among others: Martin O’Malley, Chris Christie, George Pataki), Mike Huckabee, and Rand Paul.  The Enterprise Community Partners Blog has a great piece which describes the affordable housing policy proposals of the various candidates. 

Tuesday’s Regulatory & Legislative Round-Up

  • A bill to reform Housing Assistance including programs like section 8 and project based assistance was introduced in the House Financial Services Housing Subcommittee by Republican Blaine Luetkemeyer (MO). The bill (HR 3700) seeks to streamline costs to increase efficiency and to reduce energy and water waste.
  • The Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, Texas Republican Jeb Hensarling, will be hosting a Hearing entitled The Future of Housing in America: 50 years of HUD and its Impact on Federal Housing Policy. The hearing is scheduled for Oct. 22 at 10 am and Rep. Hensarling has released a statement calling for public input. Hensarling characterizes HUD as having failed to live up to its mission, despite 1.6 trillion dollars in spending, he then calls for innovation in solving the generational cycle of poverty which, in his view, is the real issue.

Putting Disclosure to the Test

Scientist looking through microscope

Talia Gillis has posted Putting Disclosure to the Test: Toward Better Evidence-Based Policy to SSRN. This is another one of those papers that seems so esoteric, but really addresses an incredibly important topic in consumer protection.  The abstract reads,

Financial disclosures no longer enjoy the immunity from criticism they once had. While disclosures remain the hallmark of numerous areas of regulation, there is increasing skepticism as to whether disclosures are understood by consumers and do in fact improve consumer welfare. Debates on the virtues of disclosures overlook the process by which regulators continue to mandate disclosures. This article fills this gap by analyzing the testing of proposed disclosures, which is an increasingly popular way for regulators to establish the benefits of disclosure. If the testing methodology is misguided then the premise on which disclosures are adopted is flawed, leaving consumers unprotected. This article focuses on two recent major testing efforts: the European Union’s testing of fund disclosure and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s testing of the integrated mortgage disclosures, which will go into effect on August 1, 2015.

Despite the substantial resources invested in these quantitative studies, regulation based on study results is unlikely to benefit consumers since the testing lacks both external and internal validity. The generalizability of the testing is called into question since the isolated conditions of testing overlook the reality of financial transactions. Moreover, the testing method mistakenly assumes a direct link between comprehension and improved decisions, and so erroneously uses comprehension tests.

As disclosure becomes more central to people’s daily lives, from medical decision aids to nutritional labels, greater attention should be given to the testing policies that justify their implementation. This article proposes several ways to improve the content and design of quantitative studies as we enter the era of testing.

One of those clauses bears repeating: “the testing method mistakenly assumes a direct link between comprehension and improved decisions.” I have said repeatedly that the CFPB should rigorously test its financial literacy initiatives because the academic literature does not lend much support to the claim that those initiatives actually help consumers make better financial decisions.

This paper makes a strong case that the CFPB is not paying sufficient attention to the scholarly literature in this area. If so, it may, as a result, lead consumers down a path paved with good intentions that ends at a destination nobody wants to go.

Better to Be a Banker or a Non-Banker?

 

The Community Home Lenders Association (CHLA) has prepared an interesting chart, Comparison of Consumer and Financial Regulation of Non-bank Mortgage Lenders vs. Banks.  The CHLA is a trade association that represents non-bank lenders, so the chart has to be read in that context. The side-by side-chart compares the regulation of non-banks to banks under a variety of statutes and regulations.  By way of example, the chart leads off with the following (click on the chart to see it better):

CLHA Chart

The chart emphasizes all the ways that non-banks are regulated where banks are exempt as well as all of the ways that they are regulated in the identical manner. Given that this is an advocacy document, it only mentions in passing the ways that banks are governed by various little things like “generic bank capital standards” and safety and soundness regulators. That being said, it is still good to look through the chart to see how non-bank regulation has been increasing since the passage of Dodd-Frank.

Dodd-Frank and Mortgage Reform at Five

"Seal on United States Department of the Treasury on the Building" by MohitSingh - Own work. Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons - https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Seal_on_United_States_Department_of_the_Treasury_on_the_Building.JPG#/media/File:Seal_on_United_States_Department_of_the_Treasury_on_the_Building.JPG

The Department of Treasury has issued a report, Dodd-Frank at Five Years: Reforming Wall Street and Protecting Main Street. The report is clearly a political document, trumpeting the achievements of the Obama Administration. It is interesting nonetheless. It opens,

When President Obama took office in January 2009, the U.S. economy was in crisis. The nation was shedding more than 750,000 jobs per month, and confidence in our financial system had been shaken to its core. The worst financial crisis since the Great Depression exposed a toxic mix of excessive risk-taking, shoddy lending practices, inadequate capital levels, unstable funding, and weaknesses in regulatory oversight. A collapsing financial system choked off credit to consumers seeking to purchase a car, a home, groceries, or to finance an education. Nearly 9 million Americans lost their jobs, and over 5 million lost their homes. Nearly $13 trillion of families’ wealth was destroyed, wiping out almost two decades of gains.

In response to the crisis, the Administration released a proposed set of reforms in June 2009. Congress held numerous hearings and crafted legislation based on the Administration’s proposal, incorporating ideas from both Republicans and Democrats throughout the process. On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law, a historic and comprehensive set of financial reforms, which put in place critical new protections for consumers, investors, and taxpayers. Five years later—as a result of Dodd-Frank and other Wall Street reforms—our financial system is stronger, safer, more resilient, and more supportive of sustainable economic growth. Regulators also have better tools to deal with financial shocks when they occur, to protect Main Street and taxpayers from Wall Street recklessness.

Critics of reform have claimed that Wall Street Reform would deter lending and choke off the recovery. But, today it is clear that the opposite is true. Reform has served as a building block for economic growth, providing Americans with safe places to invest their savings and enabling banks to lend to individuals, businesses, and communities. Only a financial system strong enough to withstand a major financial shock is capable of promoting sustainable economic growth. Five years after the President signed Wall Street Reform into law, nearly all of the major elements of financial reform are in place. Today, our financial system is safer and stronger as a result of these hard-won reforms, and our economy is in a far better position to continue growing and creating jobs. (1)

I was struck by the fact that the report does not address the biggest financial reform failure of the last five years, the lack of reform of the housing finance system.  Fannie and Freddie remain in conservatorship, putting the housing finance system at risk of another crisis.

I was also struck by the following passage:

In the run-up to the financial crisis, abusive lending practices and unclear underwriting standards resulted in risky mortgages which hurt consumers and ultimately threatened financial stability. Wall Street Reform bans many of the abusive practices in mortgage markets that helped cause the crisis, and requires lenders to determine that borrowers can repay their loans. (2)

My recollection from academic conferences over the course of the last six or seven years is that many leading academics denied the link between abusive lending practices and systemic risk. It seemed pretty clear to me, but I was in the minority on that one. I am glad to see that at least the Treasury agrees with me.