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What Happens if Fannie and Freddie Go Private?

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I was quoted in Fintech Nexus’ Home Invasion: What Happens if Fannie and Freddie Go Private. It reads, in part,

The Trump Administration has telegraphed significant changes to GSE mortgage lenders — with massive implications for the industry

Since his swearing in on March 14 as the fifth Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), construction mogul William J. Pulte has executed major policy and personnel changes. Among other moves, Pulte has named himself board chair of the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, removed 14 of the GSEs’ 25 sitting board members, fired most of the companies’ audit boards, generally slashed headcount, and rescinded several Biden-era oversight-related advisory bulletins.

According to Professor David Reiss of Cornell Law School, a scholar of real estate finance and housing policy, Pulte’s simultaneous leadership of the FHFA in addition to roles at the GSEs, which have been under federal conservatorship since the 2008 financial crisis, is not normal.

“The whole point of regulation is you have somebody who’s overseeing an industry,” he told Fintech Nexus. “This is like the left hand [knowing] what the right hand is doing: You’re overseeing yourself, so it’s … kind of inconsistent with the notion of a supervisory regulator.”

Fintech Nexus contacted the FHFA, requesting that it comment on the impetus behind Pulte’s simultaneous self-appointments to Fannie and Freddie. The FHFA did not respond.

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CAPITAL IDEAS

One idea percolating is for the Trump Administration to use Fannie and Freddie as a pool of capital to inject into a sovereign wealth fund. An op-ed in the Financial Times by Stifel CEO Ronald Kruszewski suggested this reconfiguration could provide “continued government backing,” “stabilize investor confidence,” and “pave the way for a $1 trillion sovereign wealth fund by 2040.”

However, in a letter to the editor in the Financial Times, Dini Ajmani, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury, suggested the idea would fail, as any privatization of the GSEs would require proper capitalization, taxpayer compensation, and adequate confidence of securities investors.

“I believe the difficulty in meeting all three conditions is why [the] status quo has persisted,” Ajmani told Fintech Nexus. “To build capital, Fannie/Freddie must retain earnings, which means the taxpayer is not compensated. If the taxpayer is compensated through dividend payments, private capital will be uninterested because the agencies will be undercapitalized.”

To this end, FHFA Director Pulte may continue to atrophy many forms of GSE oversight as a way to prime the pump: Pre-empting congressional activity by deregulating Fannie and Freddie can accelerate their transition toward open-market frameworks.

The Trump Administration may see it as its only viable short-term  avenue, as many members of Congress are uninterested in bringing Fannie and Freddie out of conservatorship; Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), member of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, called the move “Great for billionaires, terrible for hardworking people.”

Should the Trump Administration succeed in its quest, we may see states attempting to fill in the gaps on regulatory accountability, rhyming with blue-state attorneys-general’s litigiousness in the wake of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s de-clawing, though this is unlikely.

“State regulators do not generally play a role similar to the two companies (except to some small extent state Housing Finance Agencies),” Reiss of Cornell Law School said. “I could imagine state agencies trying to increase consumer protection for mortgage borrowers, if the federal regulatory environment changes, but we would have to see how that plays out to understand how the states would respond.”

Will Congress Recap and Release Fannie & Freddie?

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Senator Shelby

Senator Shelby

Richard Shelby, the Chair of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs asked the Congressional Budget Office to prepare a report on The Effects of Increasing Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Capital. The report acknowledges that the legislative reform of the two companies is going nowhere, but it analyzed one potential reform option that shares characteristics with some of the GSE reform bills that have been introduced over the years. The option studied by the CBO contemplates recapitalizing the two companies along the following lines:

each GSE would be allowed to retain an average of $5 billion of its profits annually and would thus increase its capital by up to $50 billion over 10 years. The government’s commitment to purchase more senior preferred stock from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac if necessary to ensure that they maintain a positive net worth would remain in place. In addition, the GSEs would invest the profits that they retained under the option in Treasury securities, and returns on those securities would raise the GSEs’ income. Through its holdings of senior preferred stock, the government would continue to have a claim to the GSEs’ net worth ahead of other stockholders. (2, footnote omitted)

The CBO’s mandate is “to provide objective, impartial analysis,” but this report seems like it is laying the groundwork for a proposal to recapitalize Fannie and Freddie so that they can be released from conservatorship. Most policy analysts (as opposed to investors in the two companies) think that allowing the two companies to return to their prior lives as public/private hybrids is a terrible idea. It is too difficult for them to simultaneously answer to the federal regulators who set their public mission as well as to the private shareholders who would ultimately own them. And, if we were to take this path, the taxpayer would be left holding the bag once again if they were to ever need another bailout.

I think that Senator Shelby has done GSE reform a disservice by looking at this recapitalization option out of context. What we need is an analysis of a compromise plan that Congress can pass once the election is settled. Otherwise we are just leaving the two companies to limp along in conservatorship, slouching toward their next, yet unknown, crisis. Or worse, we are preparing to release them from conservatorship to go back to business as usual. Both of those options are very bad. Congress owes it to the American people to create a workable housing finance system for the 21st century that does not repeat our past mistakes.

Fannie, Freddie & The Affordable Housing Feint

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Robert J. Shapiro

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Elaine C. Kamarck

 

 

 

 

 

Robert J. Shapiro and Elaine C. Kamarck have posted A Strategy to Promote Affordable Housing for All Americans By Recapitalizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. While it presents as a plan to fund affordable housing, the biggest winners would be speculators who bought up shares of Fannie and Freddie stock and who may end up with nothing if a plan like this is not adopted.  The Executive Summary states that

This study presents a strategy for ending the current conservatorship and majority government ownership of Fannie and Freddie in a way that will enable them, once again, to effectively promote greater homeownership by average Americans and greater access to affordable housing by low-income households. This strategy includes regulation of both enterprises to prevent a recurrence of their effective insolvency in 2008 and the associated bailouts, including 4.0% capital reserves, regular financial monitoring, examinations and risk assessments by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), as dictated by HERA. Notably, an internal Treasury analysis in 2011 recommended capital requirements, consistent with the Basel III accords, of 3.0% to 4.0%. In addition, the President should name a substantial share of the boards of both enterprises, to act as public interest directors. The strategy has four basic elements to ensure that Fannie and Freddie can rebuild the capital required to responsibly carry out their basic missions, absorb losses from future housing downturns, and expand their efforts to support access to affordable housing for all households:

  • In recognition of Fannie and Freddie’s repayments to the Treasury of $239 billion, some $50 billion more than they received in bailout payments, the Treasury would write off any remaining balance owed by the enterprises under the “Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements” (PSPAs).
  • The Treasury also would end its quarterly claim or “sweep” of the profits earned by Fannie and Freddie, so their future retained earnings can be used to build their capital reserves.
  • Fannie and Freddie also should raise roughly $100 billion in additional capital through several rounds of new common stock sales into the market.
  • The Treasury should transfer its warrants for 79.9% of Fannie and Freddie’s current common shares to the HTF [Housing Trust Fund] and the CMF [Capital Magnet Fund], which could sell the shares in a series of secondary stock offerings and use the proceeds, estimated at $100 billion, to endow their efforts to expand access to affordable housing for even very low-income households.

Under this strategy, Fannie and Freddie could once again ensure the liquidity and stability of U.S. housing markets, under prudent financial constraints and less exposure to the risks of mortgage defaults. The strategy would dilute the common shares holdings of current private investors from 20% to 10%, while increasing their value as Fannie and Freddie restore and claim their profitability. Finally, the strategy would establish very substantial support through the HTF and CPM for state programs that increase access to affordable rental housing by very low-income American and affordable home ownership by low-to-moderate income households.

Wow — there is a lot that is very bad about this plan.  Where to begin? First, we would return to the same public/private hybrid model for Fannie and Freddie that got us into so much trouble to begin with.

Second, it would it would reward speculators in Fannie and Freddie stock. That is not terrible in itself, but the question would be — why would you want to? The reason given here would be to put a massive amount of money into affordable housing. That seems like a good rationale, until you realize that that money would just be an accounting move from one federal government account to another. It does not expand the pie, it just makes one slice bigger and one slice smaller. This is a good way to get buy-in from some constituencies in the housing industry, but from a broader public policy perspective, it is just a shuffling around of resources.

There’s more to say, but this blog post has gone on long enough. Fannie and Freddie need to be reformed, but this is not the way to do it.