Tag Archives: RMBS

Subprime v. Non-Prime

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photo by TaxRebate.org.uk

The Kroll Bond Rating Agency has issued an RMBS Research report, Credit Evolution: Non-Prime Isn’t Yesterday’s Subprime. It opens,

Following the private label RMBS market’s peak in 2007 and the ensuing credit crisis, non-agency securitizations of newly originated collateral have focused almost exclusively on prime jumbo loans. This is not surprising given the poor performance of loosely underwritten residential mortgage loans that characterized certain vintages leading up to the crisis. While legacy prime, in absolute terms, performed better than Alt-A and subprime collateral, it was apparent that origination practices had a significant impact on subsequent loan performance across product types.

Many consumers were caught in the ensuing waves of defaults, which marred their borrowing records in a manner that has either barred them from accessing housing credit, or at best made it extremely challenging to obtain a home loan. Others that managed to meet their obligations have been unable to qualify for new loans in the post-crisis era due to tighter credit standards that have been influenced by regulation.

The private label securitization market has not met the needs of these consumers for a number of reasons, including, but not limited to, reputational concerns in the aftermath of the crisis, regulatory costs, investor appetite, and the time needed for borrowers to repair their credit. The tide appears to be turning quickly, however, and Kroll Bond Rating Agency (KBRA) has observed the re-emergence of more than a dozen non-prime mortgage origination programs that intend to use securitization as a funding source. Of these, KBRA is aware of at least four securitization sponsors that have accessed the PLS market across nine issuances, two of which include rated offerings.

Thus far, KBRA has observed that today’s non-prime programs are not a simple rebranding of pre-crisis subprime origination, nor do they signal a return to the documentation excesses associated with “liar loans”. While the asset class is meant to serve those with less pristine credit, and can even have characteristics reminiscent of legacy Alt-A, it is expansive, and underwriting practices have been heavily influenced by today’s consumer-focused regulatory environment and government-sponsored entity (GSE) origination guidelines. In evaluating these new non-prime programs, KBRA believes market participants should consider the following factors:

■ Loans originated under sound compliance with Ability-To-Repay (ATR) rules should outperform 2005-2007 vintage loans with similar credit parameters, including LTV and borrower FICO scores. The ATR rules have resulted in strengthened underwriting, which should bode well for originations across the MBS space. This is particularly true of non-prime loans, where differences in origination practices can have a greater influence on future loan performance.

■ Loans that fail to adhere to GSE guidelines regarding the seasoning of credit dispositions (e.g. bankruptcy, foreclosure, etc.) on a borrower’s credit history should be viewed as having increased credit risk relative to those with similar credit profiles that lack recent disposition activity. This relationship likely depends on, among other things, equity position, current FICO score, and the likelihood that any life events relating to the prior credit issue remain unresolved.

■ Alternative documentation programs need to viewed with skepticism as they relate to the ATR rules, particularly those that serve borrowers with sub-prime credit histories. Although many programs will meet technical requirements for income verification, it is also important to demonstrate good faith in determining a borrower’s ability-to-repay. Failure to do so may not only result in poor credit performance, but increased risk of assignee liability.

■ Investor programs underwritten with reliance on expected rental income and limited documentation may pose more risk relative to fully documented investor loans where the borrower’s income and debt profile are considered, all else equal. (1, footnotes omitted)

I think KBRS is documenting a positive trend: looser credit for those with less-than-prime credit is overdue. I also think that KBRS’ concerns about the development of the non-prime market should be heeded — ensuring that borrowers have the ability to repay their mortgages should be job No. 1 for originators (although it seems ridiculous that one would have to say that). We want a mortgage market that serves everyone who is capable of making their mortgage payments for the long term. These developments in the non-prime market are most welcome and a bit overdue.

TRID Trials

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compliance definition

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued the TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosure (TRID) Rule which went into effect more than six months ago. The TRID Rule were designed to enhance consumer protections in the mortgage application process.  The mortgage industry has been very concerned about its ability to comply with the rule and has also highlighted the fact that borrowers now face longer waits to close as a result of the new regulatory regime. Many in the industry are calling for changes to TRID, but they are not yet in the offing. As far as I can tell, the main problems with TRID are just transition issues as the massive mortgage industry has to change in many ways, large and small, to comply with the new regime.

Kroll Bond Rating Agency has issued an RMBS Commentary which expects TRID to have only a limited impact on residential mortgage-backed securities enhancement levels. Kroll seems to be taking a reasonable position regarding the industry’s failure to consistently comply with the TRID Rule.

The commentary provides some useful information to those who follow TRID developments. Kroll believes that it “is possible many TRID-Eligible Loans originated in the near term will contain at least one technical error under TRID. Such violations, even if corrected in good faith, may carry assignee liability.” (1) At the same time, Kroll “believes the potential assignee liability stemming from TRID violations is both limited and quantifiable.” (1) It is worth contrasting this measured assessment with the histrionics that the credit rating industry displayed with the assignee liability provisions of many of the state anti-predatory lending laws that were enacted in the early 2000s.

Kroll does draw a distinction between the many TRID errors that are cropping up during this transition time and those that might occur over and over again without correction. The latter, of course, could be a magnet for class actions. That seems to me like a good outcome, particularly where the lender has been made aware of the violations by third parties.

While the mortgage industry has reasonably requested clarification of some aspects of the TRID Rule, the industry itself should be seeking to modernize and automate its processes to address not only TRID-induced changes but also the industry’s 20th century mindset. The modern mortgage closing is far from a paragon of technological efficiency.

 

The Future of Securitization

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SEC Commissioner Piwowar

SEC Commissioner Piwowar

SEC Commissioner Michael Piwowar’s Remarks at ABS Vegas 2016 are worth a look for all of those interested in the future of the mortgage-backed securities market. I have interspersed selections of his remarks with my comments:

As our country’s capital markets regulator, the SEC’s tripartite mission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.  Securitization can transform illiquid assets like mortgages, auto loans, credit card receivables, and future sales of David Bowie albums into marketable securities.  By serving as an efficient means of allocating scarce capital, securitization supports economic growth, business development, and job creation.  Securitization further fosters resiliency by diversifying the funding base of our economy.

There are many other benefits associated with securitization, including the potential for reduced costs of, and expanded access to, credit for borrowers, the ability to match risk profiles for specific investor demands, and increased secondary market liquidity.  Because banks and other originators can move loans off of their balance sheets into asset-backed securities (ABS), securitization can increase the availability of credit for both businesses and individuals.  In many instances, securitization can allow a person to obtain more favorable terms than can be obtained from a bank or other financial institution.

Thus, the ABS market serves as a critical source of capital, providing funding for home and automobile loans, credit cards, and many other purposes.  Yet, as shown during the recent financial crisis, investors may abandon the ABS market if they do not believe they possess sufficient information to evaluate the risks associated with a particular asset-backed security and to price it accordingly.

While I generally agree with Piwowar’s assessment of securitization’s value, it is worth noting that he does not acknowledge how important robust consumer protection is to maintaining a healthy securitization market over the long run.

I found his discussion of the Dodd-Frank credit risk retention rules particularly interesting:

For the record, I voted against the credit risk retention rules.  These rules require a securitizer to retain a minimum 5% credit risk of any securitization transaction and generally prohibit the sponsor from hedging its retained interest.  I was particularly dismayed by the “one-size-fits-all” approach taken by the regulators to create a flat 5% risk retention requirement for all asset classes, except for securitizations involving so-called “qualified residential mortgages” (QRMs) for which the risk retention level is zero.  These were arbitrary choices.

Residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, credit card receivables, and automobile loans each have distinct and different attributes associated with their underlying borrowers.  Rather than carefully examining these attributes to determine an optimal credit risk retention rate for each asset class, prudential regulators in Washington, D.C., took the easy way out – they simply set it at the maximum statutory rate and ignored the authorization from Congress to create lower risk retention requirements or use alternative methods to align interests.

Perhaps the prudential bureaucrats had their own conflict of interests in setting these requirements.  After all, a prudential bureaucrat has a strong interest in self-preservation.  Will a prudential bureaucrat get credit if optimally tailored risk retention rates increase economic growth and provide additional opportunities to families and businesses across America?  No.  Will a prudential bureaucrat take the blame if the next financial crisis – and there will be one eventually – relates at all to securitizations?  Probably.  Hence, what better way to side step responsibility than to refrain from using reasoned judgment and rely solely on the most risk-averse interpretation of statute instead?

Bureaucratic self-preservation might also explain the decision to adopt as broad of an exemption for QRMs as possible, so as to minimize any political fallout from the real estate and housing industries.  Few will disagree that residential mortgage-backed securities played an important role in the 2008 financial crisis.  For those in the audience involved in RMBS offerings, you must be quite happy with the broad exemption from the risk retention rules.  For those of you in the audience who are involved in other types of securitizations that had little, if any, part in causing the financial crisis, you are probably wondering why you were unfairly targeted.  Unfortunately, unlike Las Vegas, what happens in Washington does not stay in Washington. (footnotes omitted)

Piwowar gives short shrift to the benefits of clear and simple rules, but it is still worth paying attention to his critique of the “one size fits all” risk retention rules. If researchers can demonstrate that these rules are not optimally tailored, perhaps that would provide a reason to reconsider them. This is, of course, a long shot, given that the rules have been finalized, but Piwowar is right to shine light on the issue nonetheless.

Candid and thoughtful remarks from regulators are always refreshing. These make the grade.

Economic Factors That Affect Housing Prices

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photo by TaxRebate.org.uk

S&P has posted a paper on Economic Factors That Affect Housing Prices. This is, of course, an important topic, albeit one that is an art as well as a science. While S&P undertook this analysis more for mortgage-backed securities investors than for anyone else, it certainly is of use to the rest of us. The paper opens,

The U.S. domestic housing market has experienced a 23% price increase since the beginning of the housing recovery in 2011. Many local housing markets are now close to or above their peak levels of 2006, which leads us to investigate whether the pace of home price appreciation (HPA) can continue at its current pace. In this paper, we (1) examine the economic factors that influence HPA and (2) forecast HPA for numerous geographic regions assuming various economic conditions over the next five years. While the aggregate national pattern in housing prices is an important reference, we need to examine housing prices at a more granular geographic level in order to understand regional housing market dynamics and learn how these are affected by local macroeconomic factors. This paper demonstrates that several economic variables are needed to predict average home price movements for each of 48 different U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).

*     *      *

Factors that influence HPA can be difficult to predict. Therefore, residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) investors frequently use a range of HPA projections to estimate their potential bond returns. With that in mind, for each MSA, we considered five separate hypothetical economic scenarios, ranging from an “Upside” forecast to an extreme “Stress 3” case. Interestingly, our Stress 3 case forecasts a 28% decline in HPI at the national level over the next five years, which corresponds roughly to the decline experienced in the last recession. Our “base case” scenario leads to forecasts at the national level of a 26% increase in HPI over five years. This represents what we believe to be the most likely economic forecast. (1-2)

S&P’s key findings include:

  • Movement in HPA is primarily influenced by up to five variables, depending on the MSA: housing affordability, changes in shadow inventory, the unemployment rate, the TED spread [a measure of distress in the credit markets], and population growth.
  • HPA in many MSAs has momentum, meaning that it depends on its level in the previous quarter of observation.
  • The mortgage rate generally appears to have little predictive power in connection with home prices.
  • Chicago, Houston, Boston, and San Francisco are projected to appreciate at a greater pace (45%, 40%, 27%, and 36%, respectively) than the 26% forecast for the nation as a whole over the next five years, and New York at a slower pace (21%). Columbus led all MSAs with a projected five-year HPA of 50%.
  • Under our most pessimistic (Stress 3) scenario, Chicago is forecast to experience a greater decline in HPI (34%) over the next five years than the nation as a whole (29%), while New York, Boston, Houston, and San Francisco are projected to experience declines that are less severe than that of the nation (19%, 3%, 17%, and 16%, respectively). Markets that have been vulnerable in the past (Las Vegas, Phoenix, and Riverside) are projected to experience the greatest five-year declines under our Stress 3 scenario (66%, 68%, and 68%). The markets that show the greatest movements are the most sensitive to the five factors and frequently show the greatest upside and downside. (2-3, emphasis in the original)

I found the first and third bullet points to be the most interesting, as many pundits weigh in on the factors that affect housing prices. It will be interesting to see if further research confirms S&P’s findings.

Friday’s Government Reports Roundup

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  • The U.S. Government Accountability Office released “Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) Report,” showing the Treasury’s participation for TARP housing programs.
  • The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities released a report on SNAP Benefits, or what used to be known as food stamps, finding that between 500,000 and one million people will no longer received these benefits in 2016.
  • A report from Joseph A. Smith found that JPMorgan Chase has fulfilled its obligations under the required $4 billion 2013 Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Settlement.

Monday’s Adjudication Roundup

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Reps and Warranties Mean What They Say

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Derek Jensen

The New York Appellate Division, 1st Department, issued a ruling in Bank of New York Mellon v. WMC Mortgage, 654464/12 (Dec. 1, 2015) that stands for the proposition that representations and warranties regarding mortgage-backed securities mean what they say and say what they mean. The opinion opens,

This breach of warranty action arises from a residential mortgage backed securitization called the J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-WMC4 (the Trust). The Trust was arranged and sponsored by defendant J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corporation (JPMMAC), which made certain representations and warranties as to the quality of the mortgage loans in the Trust. We find that plaintiff’s interpretation of the language of the representations and warranty at issue is the only reasonable interpretation . . ..

The Pooling and Servicing Agreement represented and warranted that

“With respect to the period from [the] Whole Loan Sale Date to and including the Closing Date, [JPMMAC] hereby makes the representations and warranties contained in paragraph (a) . . . of Schedule 4 attached hereto . . . . [that] [t]he information set forth in the Mortgage Loan Schedule and the tape delivered by [WMC] to [JPMMAC] is true, correct and complete in all material respects.”

It also stated that if “JPMMAC breached a representation or warranty it made . . . it was to cure the breach within 90 days after notification; if it failed to do so, it was to repurchase the defective mortgage loan or substitute a qualifying loan for the defective one.” This is pretty standard stuff so far.

By 2012, it appeared that more than 40% of the mortgages remaining in the pool were delinquent and that the R&Ws had been violated. The certificate holders therefor demanded that JPMMAC repurchase the mortgages that were in breach of the R&Ws, which JPMMAC refused to do.

JPMorgan argued, against the plain language of the R&Ws, that it only covered defects that arose during a short period prior to the closing date of the securitization. The Court gave short shrift to this implausible reading of the R&Ws.

This opinion does not make new law, but one wonders what effect it will have on securitization business practices. R&Ws are driven by many things — concerns about credit risk, but also tax compliance with the REMIC rules, to name a couple.  I am curious as to how MBS R&Ws have changed since the early 2000s — and whether the parties to these transactions understand how R&Ws allocate risk among them.