Tag Archives: Senator Warren

What Happens if Fannie and Freddie Go Private?

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I was quoted in Fintech Nexus’ Home Invasion: What Happens if Fannie and Freddie Go Private. It reads, in part,

The Trump Administration has telegraphed significant changes to GSE mortgage lenders — with massive implications for the industry

Since his swearing in on March 14 as the fifth Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), construction mogul William J. Pulte has executed major policy and personnel changes. Among other moves, Pulte has named himself board chair of the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, removed 14 of the GSEs’ 25 sitting board members, fired most of the companies’ audit boards, generally slashed headcount, and rescinded several Biden-era oversight-related advisory bulletins.

According to Professor David Reiss of Cornell Law School, a scholar of real estate finance and housing policy, Pulte’s simultaneous leadership of the FHFA in addition to roles at the GSEs, which have been under federal conservatorship since the 2008 financial crisis, is not normal.

“The whole point of regulation is you have somebody who’s overseeing an industry,” he told Fintech Nexus. “This is like the left hand [knowing] what the right hand is doing: You’re overseeing yourself, so it’s … kind of inconsistent with the notion of a supervisory regulator.”

Fintech Nexus contacted the FHFA, requesting that it comment on the impetus behind Pulte’s simultaneous self-appointments to Fannie and Freddie. The FHFA did not respond.

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CAPITAL IDEAS

One idea percolating is for the Trump Administration to use Fannie and Freddie as a pool of capital to inject into a sovereign wealth fund. An op-ed in the Financial Times by Stifel CEO Ronald Kruszewski suggested this reconfiguration could provide “continued government backing,” “stabilize investor confidence,” and “pave the way for a $1 trillion sovereign wealth fund by 2040.”

However, in a letter to the editor in the Financial Times, Dini Ajmani, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury, suggested the idea would fail, as any privatization of the GSEs would require proper capitalization, taxpayer compensation, and adequate confidence of securities investors.

“I believe the difficulty in meeting all three conditions is why [the] status quo has persisted,” Ajmani told Fintech Nexus. “To build capital, Fannie/Freddie must retain earnings, which means the taxpayer is not compensated. If the taxpayer is compensated through dividend payments, private capital will be uninterested because the agencies will be undercapitalized.”

To this end, FHFA Director Pulte may continue to atrophy many forms of GSE oversight as a way to prime the pump: Pre-empting congressional activity by deregulating Fannie and Freddie can accelerate their transition toward open-market frameworks.

The Trump Administration may see it as its only viable short-term  avenue, as many members of Congress are uninterested in bringing Fannie and Freddie out of conservatorship; Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), member of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, called the move “Great for billionaires, terrible for hardworking people.”

Should the Trump Administration succeed in its quest, we may see states attempting to fill in the gaps on regulatory accountability, rhyming with blue-state attorneys-general’s litigiousness in the wake of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s de-clawing, though this is unlikely.

“State regulators do not generally play a role similar to the two companies (except to some small extent state Housing Finance Agencies),” Reiss of Cornell Law School said. “I could imagine state agencies trying to increase consumer protection for mortgage borrowers, if the federal regulatory environment changes, but we would have to see how that plays out to understand how the states would respond.”

Supporting The Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act

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Petar Milošević

I, along with 73 other law profs, signed a letter of support drafted by Professor Pamela Foohey (Indiana). It reads in part,

Congress enacted our current Bankruptcy Code in 1978. Much has changed since then. Even after adjusting for population growth and inflation, Federal Reserve data show that credit card debt has tripled. In 1978, student-loan debt was such a small part of household finances that the Federal Reserve did not even separately track it. Today, student-loan debt is the largest component of household debt except for home mortgages. In 1978, asset securitization was in its infancy. Mortgages and auto loans are now routinely bundled and sold to investors, separating the servicing of the loan from the financial institutions that own the loan. Advances in technology have made it easier for debt collectors to hound consumers even for debts that are decades old. In 1978, what we now think of as the Internet was a little-known research tool for academics instead of a global information revolution that has affected how Americans interact, including with consumer lenders, attorneys, and the court system. Given all these changes, it is little surprise that a forty-year-old bankruptcy law no longer serves our needs today.

The central piece of the Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act is to create a new chapter 10 for individual bankruptcy filers. The Act also eliminates chapter 7 as an option for individual filers and repeals chapter 13. Individuals will remain able to file under chapter 11 (those with debts over $7.5 million will be required to use that chapter), but for most people, the new chapter 10 will be a single point of entry into the bankruptcy system.

The single point will substantially improve the consumer bankruptcy system by replacing the current structure where consumer debtors must choose between a chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy or a chapter 13 repayment plan bankruptcy. There are substantial differences around the country in the rates at which people use chapter 7 and chapter 13. In 2019, only 9.6% of the bankruptcy cases in the District of Idaho were chapter 13 cases as compared to 81.0% of the cases in the Southern District of Georgia. The gaping disparity itself is an indictment of a federal system that the Constitution directs to be “uniform.”

Rigged Justice

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The Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren has released Rigged Justice: 2016 How Weak Enforcement Lets Corporate Offenders Off Easy. The Executive Summary states,

When government regulators and prosecutors fail to pursue big corporations or their executives who violate the law, or when the government lets them off with a slap on the wrist, corporate criminals have free rein to operate outside the law. They can game the system, cheat families, rip off taxpayers, and even take actions that result in the death of innocent victims—all with no serious consequences.

The failure to punish big corporations or their executives when they break the law undermines the foundations of this great country: If justice means a prison sentence for a teenager who steals a car, but it means nothing more than a sideways glance at a CEO who quietly engineers the theft of billions of dollars, then the promise of equal justice under the law has turned into a lie. The failure to prosecute big, visible crimes has a corrosive effect on the fabric of democracy and our shared belief that we are all equal in the eyes of the law.

Under the current approach to enforcement, corporate criminals routinely escape meaningful prosecution for their misconduct. This is so despite the fact that the law is unambiguous: if a corporation has violated the law, individuals within the corporation must also have violated the law. If the corporation is subject to charges of wrongdoing, so are those in the corporation who planned, authorized or took the actions. But even in cases of flagrant corporate law breaking, federal law enforcement agencies – and particularly the Department of Justice (DOJ) – rarely seek prosecution of individuals. In fact, federal agencies rarely pursue convictions of either large corporations or their executives in a court of law. Instead, they agree to criminal and civil settlements with corporations that rarely require any admission of wrongdoing and they let the executives go free without any individual accountability. (1)

I think the report’s central point is that the “contrast between the treatment of highly paid executives and everyone else couldn’t be sharper.” (1)

The report does not address some of the key issues that stand in the way of achieving substantive justice for financial wrongdoing. First, many of those accused of wrongdoing were well-represented by counsel who ensured that they did not violate any criminal laws, even if they engaged in rampant bad behavior. Second, contemporary jurisprudence of corporate criminal liability presents serious roadblocks to prosecutors who seek to pursue such wrongdoing. Third, many of these cases are incredibly resource heavy, even for federal prosecutors. This can incentivize them to go after other types of financial wrongdoing instead, such as insider trading.

It seems like it is too late to address much of the wrongdoing that arose from our most recent financial crisis. But if this report achieves one thing, I would hope that it gets Congress to focus on how corporations and their high-level executives could be held criminally accountable the next time around.