Tag Archives: show me the note

Should The Mortgage Follow The Note?

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The financial crisis and the foreclosure crisis have pushed many scholars to take a fresh look at all sorts of aspects of the housing finance system. John Patrick Hunt has added to this growing body of literature with a posting to SSRN, Should The Mortgage Follow The Note?. It is an interesting and important article, taking a a fresh look at the legal platitude, “the mortgage follows the note” and asking — should it?!? The abstract reads,

The law of mortgage assignment has taken center stage amidst foreclosure crisis, robosigning scandal, and controversy over the Mortgage Electronic Registration System. Yet a concept crucially important to mortgage assignment law, the idea that “the mortgage follows the note,” apparently has never been subjected to a critical analysis in a law review.

This Article makes two claims about that proposition, one positive and one normative. The positive claim is that it has been much less clear than typically assumed that the mortgage follows the note, in the sense that note transfer formalities trump mortgage transfer formalities. “The mortgage follows the note” is often described as a well-established principle of law, when in fact considerable doubt has attended the proposition at least since the middle of the last century.

The normative claim is that it is not clear that the mortgage should follow the note. The Article draws on the theoretical literature of filing and recording to show that there is a case that mortgage assignments should be subject to a filing rule and that “the mortgage follows the note,” to the extent it implies that transferee interests should be protected without filing, should be abandoned.

Whether mortgage recording should in fact be abandoned in favor of the principle “the mortgage follows the note” turns on the resolution of a number of empirical questions. This Article identifies key empirical questions that emerge from its application of principles from the theoretical literature on filing and recording to the specific case of mortgages.

The article does not answer the core question that it asks, but it certainly demonstrates that it is worth answering.

Minnesota Court Rejects Tweaked Version of Show-Me-the-Note Claim

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The court in deciding Mutua v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 Minn. Dist. 65 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 2013) found that since the defendant had a valid legal title to plaintiffs’ mortgage. Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim against either defendant and their respective motions to dismiss are granted.

This Court reasoned that there was a valid assignment of plaintiffs’ mortgages to defendant which gave defendant legal title to the mortgages and allowed Defendant to foreclose on plaintiffs’ properties.

The court noted that both the Minnesota Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had rejected the legal theory, which has become known as “show-me-the-note,” advanced by plaintiffs.

In the present action, the court noted that plaintiffs merely tweaked this legal theory and argued that based on the language of the plaintiffs’ mortgage and note, an entity different from defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company had the legal right to foreclose on plaintiffs’ homes. This argument was rejected.

California Court Dismisses Show-Me-the-Note Claim

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The court in deciding Newman v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147562 (E.D. Cal. 2013) granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint.

Plaintiff (Newman) argued that he was not challenging the authorization to foreclose, nor was he requiring defendants to “produce the note.” Rather, he was challenging whether the correct entity is initiating foreclosure. He claimed that BONY did not have the right to enforce the mortgage because it did not own the loan, the note, or the mortgage.

Plaintiff alleged claims for declaratory relief, quasi-contract, California Civil Code § 2923.5, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et. seq.) (“FDCPA”),California Business & Professions Code § 17200 (“UCL”), and negligence.

Defendants argue that dismissal is appropriate for several reasons. First, Newman could not bring an action to determine whether the person initiating the foreclosure was authorized to do so. Second, Newman’s allegations that the assignments of the deed of trust involved illegible signatures and “robo-signers” were irrelevant. Third, Newman had no standing to challenge any violations of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”).

After reviewing the arguments the court found that the claims for declaratory relief, quasi-contract, under Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.5, and under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) failed because any claims that were based on violation of the pooling and servicing agreement were not viable, the borrower was estopped from arguing that the assignment violated the automatic stay, and the allegations of fraudulent assignments were insufficient and implausible.

The negligence claim also failed. The claim under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (UCL) failed because the complaint did not state a claim for violation of the FDCPA, Cal. Penal Code § 532f(a)(4) could not have formed the basis of a UCL claim, and no violation of the Security First Rule was apparent.

(Non-)Enforcement of Securitized Mortgage Loans

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Professors Neil Cohen and Dale Whitman, two important scholars who know their way around the UCC and mortgage law, will take on a highly contested topic in an upcoming ABA Professors’ Corner webinar: “Ownership, Transfer, and Enforcement of Securitized Mortgage Loans.” I blogged a bit about this topic a couple of days ago, in relation to Adam Levitin’s new article. There is a lot of misinformation floating around the blogosphere relating to this topic, so I encourage readers to register.

The full information on this program is as follows:

Professors’ Corner is a FREE monthly webinar, sponsored by the ABA Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Section’s Legal Education and Uniform Law Group.  On the second Wednesday of each month, a panel of law professors discusses recent cases or issues of interest to real estate practitioners and scholars.

December 2013 Professors’ Corner
“Ownership, Transfer, and Enforcement of Securitized Mortgage Loans”
Profs. Neil Cohen and Dale Whitman
Wednesday, December 11, 2013
12:30pm Eastern/11:30am Cental/9:30am Pacific
Register for this FREE program at https://ambar.org/ProfessorsCorner

Our nation’s courts have been swamped with litigation involving the foreclosure of securitized mortgage loans.  Much of this litigation involves the appropriate interaction of the Uniform Commercial Code and state foreclosure law. Because few foreclosure lawyers and judges are UCC experts, the outcomes of the reported cases have reflected a significant degree of uncertainty or confusion.

In addition, much litigation has been triggered by poor practices in the securitization of mortgage loans, such as robo-signing and the failure to transfer loans into a securitized trust within the time period required by the IRS REMIC rules.  This litigation has likewise produced conflicting case outcomes.  In particular, recent decisions have reflected some disagreement regarding whether a mortgagor — who is not a party to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement that governs the securitized trust that holds the mortgage — can successfully defend a foreclosure by challenging the validity of the assignment of the mortgage to a securitized trust.

Our speakers for the December program will bring some much-needed clarity to these issues.  Our speakers are Prof. Neil B. Cohen, the Jeffrey D. Forchelli Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School, and Prof. Dale A. Whitman, the James E Campbell Missouri Endowed Professor Emeritus of Law at the University of Missouri School of Law.  Prof. Cohen is the Research Director of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, and a principal contributor to the November 2011 PEB Report, “Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to Selected Issues Relating to Mortgage Notes.” Prof. Whitman is the co-Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Property — Mortgages, and the co-author of the pre-eminent treatise on Real Estate Finance Law.

Please join us for this program.  You may register at https://ambar.org/ProfessorsCorner.

Washington Court Denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

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The court in deciding Cameron v. Acceptance Capital Mortg. Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151134 (W.D. Wash. 2013) denied the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.

Nearly all of plaintiffs’ claims turn on a single question: whether, under Washington law, Flagstar had legal authority to appoint NWTS as successor trustee. Plaintiffs first asserted that Flagstar could not have become a beneficiary with the power to appoint a successor trustee. Plaintiff reasoned that under Washington state law, MERS was an unlawful initial beneficiary and thus lacked the power to assign its interest to Flagstar.

In their reply brief plaintiffs raised an additional claim alleging that even if Flagstar held the note, it had sold it to Fannie Mae before appointing NWTS as successor trustee, thus it shed its authority to make this appointment when it did so. Ultimately, the Court finds both arguments unpersuasive.

First, the court found that this case is distinguishable from the cited Washington state case law, as Flagstar derived its authority to enforce the note from its position as the note holder, not from its position as assigned beneficiary. The court found plaintiffs’ second allegation, were raised improperly only upon reply, was similarly unconvincing as it rests on a misunderstanding of the law.

Texas Court Finds That MERS Had Authority to Assign, Thus Defendant Could Enforce Note

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The plaintiff in Hines v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153895 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2013), contended that defendants could not show an unbroken chain of title to enforce the note because MERS had no authority to assign the note to Deutsche Bank. However, the court eventually dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.

The plaintiff sought a declaration from the court that any foreclosure of her home would be wrongful because none of the defendants had standing to foreclose. The plaintiff claimed that this was due to defects in the assignment and securitization process.

The plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure allegations could be grouped into two categories: (1) MERS lacked authority to assign the deed and note from First NLC to Deutsche Bank; and (2) defendants did not comply with the securitization requirements of the applicable Pooling and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”). However, the court found that under recent Fifth Circuit case law, both of the plaintiff’s grounds for her claims failed. Thus, the court decided that her wrongful foreclosure claim must be dismissed.

Texas Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Wrongful Foreclosure Action, as MERS was Authorized to Assign the Note and Deed of Trust to Defendant

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The court in deciding Perez v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153947, 2013 WL 5781208 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2013) dismissed the plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure.

Plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s foreclosure action was wrongful. Also plaintiff alleged that the deed of trust was not enforceable due to that lack of ownership in the note by the defendants.

Plaintiff asserted that First NLC, rather than MERS, was the only party authorized to assign the note and deed of trust to the defendant; she asserted that assignment is only complete upon recording, and recording has not been effectuated; and she asserted that the deed of trust and the transfer of lien document were fraudulently created, and therefore ineffective as a security instrument and assignment, respectively. Additionally, plaintiff asserted that the note and deed of trust were not enforceable because they had been split.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant argued that plaintiff has not stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure because she has not alleged that her home had been foreclosed.

Ultimately, the court rejected the plaintiff’s claims and the broader legal theories she asserted; however, the court granted the plaintiff leave to amend to allow her an opportunity to assert a valid claim.